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I.

INTRODUCTION

In environmental terms, the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries were no more than periods of accumulated toxic
neglect. Intent on maximizing employment, the public and
legal systems tolerated and even promoted this toxic neglect.
These circumstances persisted until the American public was
mobilized, out of necessity, to alter the status quo and begin
environmental protection efforts.
It is rapidly becoming
apparent that much of the twenty-first century will be directed
toward reverse engineering and remedying this accumulated
toxic neglect-technically, politically, and juridically.
Since circa 1980, the explosion of toxic tort litigation has
substantively and procedurally challenged traditional tort law.
To date, however, despite some response to the change in
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author practices in Laguna Hills, California and is a member of the California,
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and Philippine Bars. The authors dedicate this article to the memory of their
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circumstances brought by this explosion of litigation, the
judicial system has neither fully nor adequately addressed
many of the most basic differentials between traditional tort
law and emerging toxic torts. This is particularly true with
regard to emotional distress injury and damage arising from an
infinite variety of toxic episodes. Such episodes include toxic
exposure of people via pathways from contaminated air, soil,
and water; toxic related interruptions to people's freedom of
movement; and toxic impacts causing loss in property value.
These toxic episodes are especially manifested in
California, a state with a legacy of toxic insult and incubation
commencing with gold mining operations at Sutter's Mill on the
American River in 1848, if not before.' In addition to mining
contamination of soil and water from its tailings and chemical
wastes,2 there have been significant pollution and hazardous
material releases in California from or involving the following:
lumbering and milling,3 agricultural animal waste,4 pesticides,5
oil and gas exploration,6 oil and gas production, distribution,
and refining (including underground pipelines, hazardous
material transportation, leaking pipelines, and storage tanks),'
1. See, e.g., GAVIN M. CRAIG, CALIFORNIA WATER LAW IN PERSPECTIVE

LXXI (West 1971).
2. See, e.g., People v. New Penn Mines, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963). Mercury was used extensively in hydraulic mining to separate gold from
ore, thereby polluting watersheds and now food chains.
3. See, e.g., Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271
Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
4. See, eg., Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Coop., Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 102
(Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (concerning a dairy farm); Wade v. Campbell, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (concerning a dairy farm).
5. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287 (1993)
(involving 110 tons of DDT dumped into a sewage system); Mitchell v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591 (1984); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489 (1948)
(concerning fumigation); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993); SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(concerning crop dusting); Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal.
App. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App.
1937) (concerning aerial crop dusting).
6. See, e.g., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928) (involving
oil drilling); Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving a natural gas processing plant); Cottle v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
7. See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (involving an oil reservoir); Angeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer &
Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (regarding severed underground
petrochemical pipeline); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (involving a leaking underground fuel tank); Blackwell v. Phelps
Dodge Corp., 203 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Colson v. Standard Oil Co.,
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landfill and waste disposal sites,8 utilities,9 leaching into
aquifers" and coastal runoff" of pesticides12 and wastes, 3 failing
sewage lines and treatment plants surtaxed by age and5
increasing demand, 4 the aerospace defense industry,
shipyard 6 and other manufacturing industries, 7 and present
131 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (involving incident where plaintiff was
sprayed with sulfuiric acid from leaking pipeline).
8. See, eg., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993)
(involving contaminated landfill); Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882 (involving a
residential subdivision on top of a dump site for oil industry hazardous wastes);
Cosman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. 37-48-02 (Orange County Super. Ct.) (the
McColl Toxic Dump Site; residential subdivisions encroached near abandoned
dump site containing 50,000 tons of contaminated jet fuel) (discussed at 1
MARSHALL HouTs ET AL., COURTROOM TOXICOLOGY ch. 7 (1994)).
9. See Kennedy v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 219 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2000)
(involving radioactive "fuel fleas" alleged to have been taken home by worker from
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station causing wife's cancer); Ahrens v. Superior
Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (involving electrical transformer
PCBs).
10. See, eg., Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 965; Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d
591 (1984); cf. 27 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 217 (1956).
11. See, eg., CAL. WATER CODE § 13142.5 (West 2000).
12. See, eg., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 4th 287 (1993)
(involving 110 tons of DDT dumped into sewage system now covering 17 square
miles of ocean floor off Palos Verdes Peninsula); Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving pesticide (DBCP) contaminating
drinking water in nearby school).
13. See, eg., People v. Chevron Chem. Co., 191 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (involving fertilizer process wastes); People v. City of Los Angeles, 325 P.2d
639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); cf. Jordan v. City of Santa Barbara, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
14. See Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal. 3d 285 (1977) (involving a
sewage treatment plant); Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 317 P.2d 33 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1957) (involving a sewer line overflow).
15. See, eg., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000), review granted, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal. 2000); McKelvey v.
Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); AerojetGen. Corp. v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Smith v.
Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
16. See, eg., Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953 (1997) (involving
plaintiff who worked 40 years in Mare Island Naval Shipyard and contracted
asbestosis).
17. See, e., Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265 (1955)
(concerning a cotton ginning plant); Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362 (1933) (involving
an asphalt mixing plant); Washington v. County of Contra Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d
646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (concerning oleum/sulfuric acid); Bangert v. Narmco
Materials, 209 Cal. Rptr. 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (involving plastics research
plant); Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (involving a fiberglass manufacturing plant); Diamond v. General Motors
Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (involving 293 industrial corporations
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and formerly used defense sites, known as "FUDS.'' 8

California's incredible population growth exacerbated the
toxic import of these historic endeavors. This growth gave
rise to increased demands on finite natural resources such as
potable water and land. Urban sprawl developed previously
remote areas where toxic dumping and manufacturing
frequently occurred. In the last twenty years, these dramatic
toxic events and the invention of advanced investigative
technology have collectively raised societal awareness of the
toxic implications, triggering an epidemic of toxic tort
litigation.
Because there are relatively few decisions relevant to this
now exploding toxic tort field, lawyers are eagerly awaiting
further judicial definition, clarification, amplification, and
direction. This is particularly so in regard to the availability
of emotional distress damages resulting from toxic torts. To
compound this problem, emotional distress damages were a
highly contested issue, even prior to the advent of the toxic
tort explosion.
The law has long been skeptical of emotional distress
claims, as they frequently are purely subjective and easily
feigned. As a consequence, elaborate concepts have been
developed to assure their genuineness. Many of those now
and municipalities alleged to have polluted the atmosphere in Los Angeles County,
including automobile manufacturers); Christopher v. Jones, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1964) (involving a chemical repackaging plant); Hagy v. Allied Chem. &
Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (involving sulfur trioxide /
sulfuric acid); Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 233 P.2d 914 (Cal. Ct. App.
1951) (involving a cement manufacturing plant).
18. See Defense Environmental Restoration Program, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§
2901-2911, 104 Stat. 1808 (1990) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1999));
Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987); Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1814 (1990); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 33492 (West 2000).
Since about 1940, California, along with the rest of the western coastal
states, served as the military research and development, testing, production,
and logistical staging area for supplying Pacific Theater Operations in World
War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War. These were
imperatives, which at those times, understandably preempted domestic
ecological concerns. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), review granted, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal.
2000); McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953 (1997); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Smith v.
Lockheed Propulsion Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); see also Arcade
Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1991).
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traditional concepts lack relevance to those who have been
exposed to toxic and other hazardous materials.
This article examines the uncertainty surrounding the
availability of emotional distress damages in toxic tort
litigation under California law. Section II discusses the state
of modern toxic tort law, including the general issues left
unresolved by the relatively recent decisions in Potter and
Cottle and the new issues that toxic megatorts present.
Section III provides background information on the types of
toxic torts and how the government usually handles them.
Section IV details the impact of traditional liability theories
on damages resulting from hazmat exposure, and provides
guidance to plaintiffs for the best recovery for emotional
distress damages. Section V compares severe emotional
distress damages resulting from hazardous materials
incidents, first with reference to economic loss, and then
without reference to economic loss. Finally, Section VI
concludes that damages for emotional distress and damages
for other intangible harm constituting legal detriment may be
available under traditional tort principles to individuals who
are endangered and fear for their safety as a result of a
hazmat incident, even in the absence of physical injury.
II. MODERN TOxIC TORTS

A. Recent Developments RegardingEmotional Distress in
Toxic Tort Law
In the 1990s, the California courts handed down two
significant toxic tort decisions involving emotional distress.
These were Cottle v. Superior Court9 ("Cottle"), and Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 20 ("Potter").

In a real sense, these two decisions are only the opening
salvos of judicial responses to the following real toxic law
questions. First, what juridical impedimenta will victims have
to traverse to successfully prosecute their toxic tort cases?
Second, from a public policy standpoint, who will be brought to
bear the manifold social costs arising from toxic contamination:
victims, taxpayers, or the contaminators-and, where
appropriate, the contaminators' insurers and governmental
19. 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
20. 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993).
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agency customers?
Unfortunately, as discussed herein, neither Cottle nor
Potter fully address or clarify the unique aspects of toxic torts in
relation to causation, burden of proof, and damage issues. In
some regards, the issue of who will bear the costs has been
finessed by stringently dealing with victims' claims,
particularly their claims for emotional distress damages.2" In
this context, this article examines the issues relating to the
emotional distress damages often sustained by victims of
hazardous material ("hazmat")22 releases which Cottle and
Potter alluded to, but did not definitively resolve. After the
Potter court specifically identified some of these "hard" toxic
issues, the majority took inordinate care to explain that these
issues were not before the court and would not be addressed.2 3
As discussed, infra, it is quite significant that Potter was an
action that pleaded only negligence, negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability/ultrahazardous activity.24
Pleading the alternate theories of
nuisance and trespass probably would have changed the
outcome of the case.
Also of interest is that the Potter court did not make any
reference whatsoever to the earlier Second District Court of
Appeals' Cottle decision. The Cottle complaint, in addition to
negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and strict liability based on ultra-hazardous activity
(personal injuries, just as pleaded in Potter), also alleged severe
emotional distress based upon private and public nuisance,
trespass, fraud, deceit, and property damage. 5
21. Indeed, the dissenting opinions in both Cottle and Potter most
eloquently raise these and other profound and still unanswered questions which
the courts must, in time, directly address.
22. "Hazardous material" usually means any material that, because of its
quantity, concentration, or physical or chemical characteristics, poses a significant
present or potential hazard to human health and safety or to the environment if
released into the workplace or the environment. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25501(o) (West 1999). See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tits. 22, 26-27 (2000).
See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25501.1; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
726.5(e)(4) (West 1999); 40 C.F.R. pt. 355 (2000). Note that hazmat may be
chemical, radiological, bacterial, fungal, or viral, and may be corrosive, ignitable,
toxic, or explosive. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 108125, 108165-108185.
23. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 980; cf. Aas v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 627,
652 n.16 (2000) (The Potter decision was "painstakingly limited to its specific
factual and legal context.").
24. See infra Part IV.
25. The court said:
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In Cottle, the court was reviewing only the preclusion of
personal physical injury claims by the trial court because the
trial court "found that plaintiffs had established their prima
facie cases regarding their emotional distress and property
damages claims, but not their personal physical injury
claims."2 6 Thus, pleading durable, viable causes of action that
can effectively sustain emotional distress damages is quite
critical.
Potter and Cottle left a litany of additional uncertainties. It
is quite significant that neither Potter nor Cottle involved
single, isolated, "toxic cloud" type of factual circumstances, with
7
their own unique and profound psychological impacts.
What is not resolved by these decisions is whether the
judicial system can or will accommodate both plaintiffs with
minimal or transient present and patent emotional distress
toxic injuries as well as those plaintiffs whose emotional
distress toxic injuries are latent, or not completely manifested
until later. The rule against splitting a cause of action, statutes
In the underlying Cottle action, approximately 175 owners and renters
of certain residential properties located in the Oxnard Dunes (the
Dunes) residential subdivision in Oxnard, California sued various
defendants . . . for personal injuries (both physical injuries and

emotional distress injuries) and property damages as a result of
defendants' construction and development of the Dunes on a site that
for many years had been used as a dumping ground for certain oil
industry wastes and other byproducts. In particular, plaintiffs allege
that they suffered injuries due to defendants' failure to disclose the
prior use of the property.
Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis
added). See also Dolan v. Buena Eng'rs, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 903, 905-06 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (lead case consolidated with Cottle discussing both of their identical
pleadings); cf. McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999). The McKelvey pleadings were similar to those of Dolan/Cottle. See id. at
650 n.3. That is, the Dolan/Cottle and McKelvey pleadings included significantly
more causes of action than those of Potter. While the Cottle evidentiary sanction
precluded physical injury damages only, the McKelvey action was dismissed in
whole on demurrers without leave to amend on the ground that the statute of
limitations had run and the allegations of the complaints were insufficient to
invoke the delayed discovery rule exception. It is unclear why the causes of action
for continuing trespass and continuing public and private nuisance were dismissed
on that ground as well. See id. at 651 n.6. But see Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746,
750-52 (1923); Angeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer & Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993). The whole issue is enough to cause plaintiffs' counsel severe emotional
distress for fear of malpractice. See Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
26. Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 890.
27. See infra Part V.B.
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of limitation, and the belated discovery rule are all concerns
which impact latent emotional distress toxic injuries.
B.

Toxic Megatorts
Another issue left unresolved by the decisions in Potter and
Cottle is what the response should be to emotional distress
damages sustained from toxic megatorts.
Contra Costa
County, located east of the San Francisco Bay in Northern
California is illustrative of this phenomenon.28 It provides an
example of a major collision point between petrochemical and
certain defense industry facilities, on the one hand, and
encroaching suburban home building on the other. This county
affords an opportunity to study hazmat releases and all of their
impacts. 9 For example, in 1993 a rail tank car in a gasoline
refinery complex ruptured, releasing a cloud of sulfuric acid
which was estimated to be three miles wide and fifteen miles
long. This occurred during a business day and resulted in
direct civil actions initially filed on behalf of some 65,000
individually named plaintiffs," as well as extensive legal media

28. Contra Costa County is monitored by the Bay Area Air Quality
Management District (See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24368-24368.7
(West 1992). See generally Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal.
Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).) and the San Francisco Bay Water Quality
Control Region Board (See CAL. WATER CODE § 13200(b) (West 1992).), with
concomitant local government controversy (See Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see Contra Costa County
Hazardous Materials Commission, Report to the Contra Costa County Board of
Supervisors on Environmental Justice (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter Report on
Hazardous Materials] (on file with author)) and grand jury investigations (See,
e.g., 1992-1993 Contra Costa County Grand Jury Report No. 9301, Dec. 1992; 19881989 Contra Costa County Grand Jury Reports (each of which a court may take
judicial notice); see also CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 452-453 (West 1995); People v.
Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 430 (1975); In re David C., 200 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984)).
29. See Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953) (involving a prior sulfuric acid cloud released from the same General
Chemical facility in Washington v. County of Contra Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995)). Contra Costa County constitutes a classic case study of
economic and emotional toxic impacts and disruption upon the citizenry, and
judicial responses to resultant toxic tort litigation. See Report on Hazardous
Materials, supra note 28.
30. See In re General Chem. Corp. Richmond Works, Judicial Council
Coordinated Proceeding No. 2906 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa County) (on file
with author); see also Washington v. County of Contra Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (arising out of the release and dismissing the County as a
defendant on governmental immunity grounds).
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coverage,3 a congressional hearing, 2 a congressional report,33 a
health
environmental
governmental
state
California
34 and an academic study of its psychological
investigation,
impacts. 5 There was a $180,000,000 settlement, most of which
was allocated for personal injury and exemplary/punitive
damages, but the personal injury damages appear to have been
overwhelmingly for emotional distress, and not physical injury,
in view of the court's finding that the claims involved "minimal
or transitory injury."
In addition to such single, isolated releases of hazmat into
the air, more and more soil and groundwater pollution is being
discovered. No doubt, this is in part due to hazmat migration
and permeation into potable water tables, urban sprawl
towards once isolated dumping grounds, agricultural fields, and
past and present industrial sites. In the wake of such highly
dramatic and sometimes horrific events, victims, lawyers, and
even courts are typically preconditioned to expect astronomical
injuries and profound damages. Fortunately, to date, reality
frequently proves otherwise and many victims are not
profoundly injured, at least not physically. Nevertheless, many
of these toxic episodes negatively impact residential areas and
the families housed therein. The largest single asset of most
citizens typically is the financial investment they make in their

31. See, eg., Susan Hansen, Money for Nothing?, THE AMERICAN LAWYER,
Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 60-69 (discussing and criticizing the global settlement of $180
million).
32. See The Community and Toxics: Accidents Involving HazardousMaterials,
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on NaturalResources, 103d Cong. 100-02, 1st Sess. (1993) (hearing
on Richmond tank car toxic release).
33. See STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
COMM. ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 103D CONG., REPORT ON LIVING WITH RISK:
COMMUNITIES AND THE HAZARD OF INDUSTRIAL CONTAMINATION (Comm. Print

1994).
34. See Sandra McNeel et al., Acute Health Effects Due to a Large Sulfuric
Acid Release in Richmond, California, July 1993, Environmental Health
Investigation Branch, Division of Environmental Health and Occupational Disease
Control, California Department of Health Services (1995) (on file with author).
35. See Rosemarie M. Bowler et al., Adverse Health Effects in African
American Residents Living Adjacent to Chemical Industries, 22 J. BLACK PSYCHOL.

473 (1996).
36. See Judgment on Order Granting Final Approval of Class Settlement,
filed Nov. 30, 1995, In re General Chem. Corp. Richmond Works, Judicial
Council Coordinated Proceeding No. 2906 (Cal. Super. Ct., Contra Costa
County) (on file with author); Order Granting Motions for Final Approval of
Class Settlement, filed Nov. 22, 1995, at 4 (on file with author).
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own homes. Contamination of those homes or of their
neighborhoods could well destroy the economic value of their
investment. 17
Such a profound pecuniary loss can
understandably trigger severe emotional distress per se, quite
independent from that caused by psychological trauma to a
person resulting
from direct hazmat exposure to himself or his
8
family.
Whatever their economic detriment and emotional distress
damages may be, the judicial process entitles such victims to
full redress. In order to cope with such massive toxic tort
litigation, courts increasingly serve as "gatekeepers" 9 in order
to determine whether such damage claims will be allowed to
proceed and, if so, how.4° While this judicial "gatekeeping"
function is often directed at medical causation in personal
injury-toxic tort litigation,4 it is also directed at assessing the
37. See, e.g., Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 248 Cal. Rptr.
384, 388-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); cf. Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Emptor:
Disclosure to Buyers of Contaminated Land, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 169 (1991);
see infra Part V. See generally CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 726.5 (West 2000)
(potential impacts upon the anti-deficiency statute and other real estate
interests); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West 2000).
38. See generally 1 HouTs ET AL., supra note 8, ch. 7; FRED SETTERBERG &
LONNY SHAVELSON, ToxIc NATION: THE FIGHT To SAVE OUR COMMUNITIES FROM
CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION (1993).
39. See Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(Exercising its "inherent powers," the trial court terminated causes of action for
personal injury via an evidentiary exclusion order made during motions in limine,
in lieu of a summary judgment before trial, or nonsuit or directed verdict during
trial.). By way of contrast, statutory examples of the gatekeeping function of the
court are those requiring plaintiffs to establish pre-trial a prima facie case: (1) for
civil conspiracy against an attorney (See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.10 (West 1998).) or
(2) for punitive damages against a health care provider (See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.13 (West 2000).), before they are allowed to plead a conspiracy cause of action
or punitive damage allegations, respectively.
40. Courts have latitude in fashioning novel procedural solutions. See CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 128, 404 (West 1999); CAL. R. CT. 1500 (West 2000) (regarding
coordination of complex cases); CAL. R. CT. 1800 (West 2000) (regarding "complex
cases" which require special judicial case management, including those involving
environmental and toxic tort claims or mass tort claims); CAL. R. CT. APP. § 19(h)
(West 2000) (regarding complex litigation); see also Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882; cf
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (3d ed. 1995).
41. See, e~g., Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882. A case management order requiring
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of causation is commonly referred to as a
"Lone Pine" order after Lore v. Lone Pine, Inc., No. L33606-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Nov.
19, 1996) (no appeal taken from the trial court ruling). See Shelley Brinker,
Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An Analysis of the Causation
Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289
(1999); Erin KL. Mahaney, Assessing the Fitnessof Novel Scientific Evidence in the
Post-Daubert Era: Pesticide Exposure Cases as a Paradigm for Determining
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genuineness or the significance of intangible emotional distress
damage claims, claims for economic detriment, and claims for
emotional distress.42 In some cases, alleged emotional distress
may be predicated in whole or in part upon serious economic
detriment or pecuniary loss.43
Toxic and other hazmat releases raise present personal
injury and property damage issues. However, they also
frequently involve unique future economic damages such as
medical monitoring costs and delayed pecuniary losses, as well
as future personal damages, such as post-traumatic stress
disorders, diverse emotional distress manifestations, future
physical symptoms, and other forms of detriment. The fact that
long latency periods may follow hazmat exposure is now
judicially recognized and accepted.44 Such present damages, if
modest in relation to the initially perceived magnitude of the
hazmat episode, and such deferred damages, are frequently
overlooked or ignored by victims' counsel and by courts.
Hazmat releases may also arrest or impede one's freedom
For instance, the release of a chemical fog,
movement.
of
smoke, or spray of such density as to impede and obstruct the
free and safe use of a highway, making it dangerous and unsafe
for vehicular travel, is a nuisance. 4 Such impediment to free
movement may be compelled, simply recommended by
governmental action through the exercise of police powers,4 or
created by the mere exercise of common sense by members of
the public affected by the release. Such constraints on
Admissibility, 26 ENVTL. L. 1161 (1996).
42. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993); see also
Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of
Scientific Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181
(1993).
43. See PAUL G. BRECKENRIDGE, JR., CALIFoRNIA BOOK OF APPROVED JURY
INSTRUCTIONs No. 12.85 (8th ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997) [hereinafter BAJI] (citing
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
But see Soto v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 229 Cal. Rptr. 192, 200-01 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(distinguishing Jarchow and denying emotional distress damages based on
"garden-variety negligence concepts"). See infra Part V.
44. Indeed, latency is often recognized as a unique characteristic of hazmat
exposure. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 980; Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
45. See, e~g., Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959); cf. Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361
(Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
46. See, eg., CAL. Gov'r CODE § 8550 (West 1999) (California Emergency
Services Act); Adkins v. State, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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movement frequently trigger damage considerations apropos, if
not somewhat unique, to hazmat episodes.47 Resulting damage
claims may consist of severe emotional distress, even in the
absence of physical impact. This can be based upon discomfort
or anxiety, as in nuisance, or fear or anxiety, as in negligence.
In the final analysis, many damage claims based on the
impairment of one's freedom and disruption of movement may
prove to be relatively minor depending upon the specific facts
presented. However, it does not necessarily follow that all such
economic detriment and emotional distress damage claims are
without merit. Defendants often argue that these dramatic,
widely publicized, and sometimes catastrophic incidents are no
more than open invitations for fraudulent and frequently trivial
claims for damages.4 8 Similar skepticism (if not cynicism) is
often directed to claimed emotional and mental suffering which
may be highly subjective, particularly in the absence of strong
indicia of genuineness, such as physical impact or physical
injury. However, as discussed, infra,4 9 both Cottle and Potter
47. Damages for physical injuries immediately and directly sustained by one
exposed to hazmat are beyond the scope of this article.
48. Counsel for toxic tort plaintiffs have been accused of engaging in iatrogenic
or choreographic tactics. In Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 591, 610-11
(1984), a claimant seeking emotional distress damages from contamination of an
aquifer was asked to provide information of communication received by the
claimant from her attorney concerning the harmful effects of the contaminant. The
California Supreme Court refused the discovery, stating in part that:
Such a holding [permitting discovery] would potentially uphold a
harassment tactic whereby defendants such as these are able to shift
the focus of the case from damages caused by chemical pollutants to
damages caused by allegedly inflammatory or false information
provided by self-serving attorneys ....
[Tihe implications of their
arguments are unmistakably clear. In other similar cases, defendant
chemical manufacturers have contended that plaintiffs' injuries were
caused not by exposure to toxic chemicals but rather by hysteria
induced by plaintiffs' doctors. Once again, this technique not only
obfuscates many of the substantive issues in a case but also frequently
places the wrong "defendant" on trial. Quite simply, such tactics
should not be tolerated in the courts of this state.
Id. Cf. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 901-02 (1991). Media
reports of a "psychologically devastating event" are not the source of emotional
distress damages and do not affect the plaintiffs standing; however, they go to the
"reasonableness" of a plaintiffs claim for severe emotional distress. See
id.
Christensen, a non-toxic cremation case, was heavily and repeatedly relied upon by
the Potter majority. Its relevance to toxic torts is tenuous, at best, inasmuch as
Christensen involved the disposition of cremated remains, and neither life
threatening trauma to one or one's family, nor loss of the value of one's home. See
Hansen, supranote 31.
49. See infra Part V.B.
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are quite clear that in toxic cases, neither physical impact nor
physical injury is required for emotional distress and property
damage claims. The real question is the genuineness of such
emotional distress claims. This is true whether they are
predicated upon the nature of the toxic episode, the trauma of
the toxic episode, the economic loss, or all of the foregoing.

III. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENTS AND THE RESULTING
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE
HazardousMaterials Incidents
The infinite varieties of factual circumstances surrounding
toxic tort cases are beyond measure and may arise over or exist
for only minutes or decades. They may involve any number of
hazardous materials, alone or in combination with others, and
in many forms. Hazmat incidents may occur anywhere in situ
or in transit, and may contaminate or threaten to contaminate
This may result in pollution or
air, soil, or water.
contamination that causes or threatens to cause personal
injury, property damage, or interference with the rights of
citizens." While hazmat releases into the air may produce
immediate adverse impact,51 the more insidious, "slower"
contamination of groundwater and soil also can harm and
frequently result in the same detriment, including property
Such "slower" releases
damage, fear, and evacuation.52
A.

50. A hazmat release incident is one where the hazmat may be identified and
the emissions traced to an identifiable or isolated point source, such as an oil
refinery adjacent to a residential community. See, eg., Hagy v. Allied Chem. &
Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953). The problem of overall
pollution, as in urban air pollution occurring daily and hazmat emanating from
several sources, and which are subject to regulatory controls, is not treated as a
hazmat incident in this article. See, eg., Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). However, it is settled that a single event
can constitute a nuisance. See Ambrosini v. Alisal Sanitary Dist., 317 P.2d 33 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957).
51. Airborne hazmat requires special consideration because typically a toxic
cloud disperses within minutes leaving no trace in the air, or evidence on the
ground may dissipate in a short time. See generally Margie Tyler Searcy, How to
Handle a Toxic Cloud Case, in 3 A GUIDE TO ToxIc TORTS 31-1, 31-1 to 31-151
(1998).
52. See, eg., Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928). Residents
were forced to leave their home following the blow-out of an oil well being drilled in
a neighboring property, which resulted in oil, mud, and rocks falling onto their
property, entitling them to "eviction" damages. See id.; see also Newhall Land &
Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (hazmat
discharged onto ground leached through the soil and polluted groundwater

674

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

typically involve migrating pollution from inactive or
abandoned disposal sites, hazardous waste sites, and industrial
facilities. In the case of an abandoned site or of a hazardous
waste disposal site, the difficulties confronting a victim include
identifying the (potentially large) number of possible
tortfeasors, i.e., the generators and transporters of hazmat,53
and identifying or isolating the chemical(s) responsible for any
claimed injury. 4
While hazmat releases frequently involve fixed or

stationary facilities and often have off-site effects, " the threat
from hazmat transporters such as railroad tank cars and
highway trucks cannot be ignored.56
Their mobility and
concealed nature greatly lessen the ability of society to protect
itself against such transient releases. For example, evacuation
of thousands of persons from their homes and businesses may
well be the only remedy to avoid possible injury from an
resulting in a public nuisance; landowner could not sell the property and suffered
damages).
53. See Colin Scott Cole Fulton, Comment, Hazardous Waste: Third-Party
Compensation for ContingenciesArising from Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous
Waste Disposal Sites, 33 S.C. L. REV. 543, 571-73 (1982); Robert C. Vohl, Note,
Unearthing Defendants in Toxic Waste Litigation: Problems of Liability and
Identification,19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 891 (1982).
54. For instance, personal injury evidence was ordered excluded in the case of
residents and former residents of a residential subdivision built on top of a site
used several years for the dumping of oil industry hazardous wastes. The residents
admitted their inability to specify which chemical in the "caldron of chemicals" in
the site caused their claimed injuries, leaving emotional distress and property
damage claims. See Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 884-86 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); cf. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993). Such
an "identity crisis" is virtually insurmountable where the exposure is to manifold
hazmat. See Brinker, supra note 41, at 1298-99.
55. Airborne release of hazmat from a facility may foreseeably impact
surrounding neighborhoods based upon knowledge of the predominate wind
direction for the area. Some courts "don't need a weatherman to know which way
the wind blows," and may take judicial notice of such basic facts. See, eg.,
Jorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 177 Cal. Rptr. 882, 887 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (citing Bob Dylan's song SubterraneanHomesick Blues as authority for doing
so); cf. Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988) (employees of a toxic chemical plant criticized a proposed residential
development adjacent to and downwind of the plant which was "a place unsafe and
hazardous for human life and health"); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1937) (pesticidal dust sprayed from aerial crop duster above adjoining
land drifted in a light breeze killing 56 hives of bees); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §
14021 (West 1999).
56. See, eg., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7671 (West 2000) ("Hazardous Materials
Transportation By Rail"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25160 (West 2000)
(regarding transportation of hazmat); see also Blackwell v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,
203 Cal. Rptr. 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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overturned hazmat railroad tanker 7 or from a leaking
pipeline.58 Railroad tank cars and semi-trailer trucks are often
used as storage receptacles59 as well as transport vehicles.
Hazmat sources are infinite and ubiquitous.
Urban expansion has encroached upon areas historically
used for a multitude of hazmat industrial purposes and has
reached into established agricultural areas as well. Hazards
from agricultural crop pesticide applications and drift ° are
particularly profound because pesticides by definition are
poisons designed to attack and destroy living organisms and
are deliberately released into the environment for that specific
purpose through various media, including aerial spraying and
dusting, which carry the risk of pesticide spillage from the
intended target area.6 Non-target victims may be sprayed
directly or exposed indirectly through the drift phenomenon,
and the usual casualties are neighbors of pesticide users,
frequently including homes, schools (including schoolchildren,
teachers, and staff), crops, and livestock.62
Home, school, and work venues are often affected by
releases63 but there is no denying that every sector of the
57. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wollenmann, 390 N.E.2d 669 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1979) (involving a tanker filled with liquid propane which created a risk of
explosion and fire).
58. See Colson v. Standard Oil Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(involving sulfuric acid sprayed in plaintiffs face); McGee v. Shell Oil Co., 659 So.
2d 812, 814 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (involving sulfuric acid that spilled from a pipeline
onto a ditch, vaporizing into the atmosphere, and resulting in evacuation of 41
residences); Melso v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 576 A.2d 999 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(involving a pipeline that broke, spilling 50,000 gallons of gasoline, and causing the
evacuation of residents of a housing development).
59. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25503.7 (West 2000) (entitled
"Railroad car or marine vessel remaining at same facility more than 30 days;
hazardous contents deemed stored; notice to administering agency"); cf. Blackwell,
203 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (involving workers sprayed with sulfuric acid unloading rail
tank car).
60. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 12972 (pesticides are to be used in a
manner that prevents substantial drift to nontarget areas); see also 40 C.F.R. §
170.210(a).
61. See generally Robert F. Bloomquist, Applying Pesticides: Toward
Reconceptualizing Liability to Neighbors for Crop, Livestock and Personal
Damagesfrom Agricultural Chemical Drift, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 393 (1993).
62. See id. See also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES 326-30 (1988).
63. See generally NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD & CLAUDIA S. MILLER, CHEMICAL
EXPOSURES: Low LEVELS AND HIGH STAKES (1991); JANETrE D. SHERMAN,
CHEMICAL EXPOSURE AND DISEASE: DIAGNOSTIC AND INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
(1994); FRANK E. JONES, TOXIC ORGANIC VAPORS IN THE WORKPLACE (1994).

These releases are often called "sick building syndromes." See id.; see also CAL.

676

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

population is at risk.6 4 Some victims may be far more
vulnerable to economic and psychological impacts than others."
Of course, not every interference with one's movement will be
deemed an invasion of one's liberty interests or property rights.
There are normal inconveniences incident to living in an
increasingly complex and compact society which are not
actionable." However, it is rare for a hazmat release to be
deemed a "normal" incidente7 that society can tolerate.
Certainly, statutory schemes, if not public policies, dictate
otherwise.
B.

Governmental Response to HazardousMaterialsIncidents

A hazmat release requires an immediate assessment and
investigation to ascertain whether the release warrants
intervention to protect public health and safety and, if so, the
kind of intervention. In most cases, prudence would require
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 105400-105430 (West 1999) (Indoor Environmental
Quality).
64. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25534.1. A hazmat accident risk
management plan prepared by a hazmat handler pursuant to statute must
consider proximity of specific populations including residential areas, schools,
hospitals, health care, and day care facilities.
In disastrous episodes, disaster mental health services by necessity often
are directed first to the disaster workers themselves, and often are provided by
volunteers. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25511(d)-(e) (requiring
disclosure of hazmat inventory and processes includes trade secret information
but only to recognized administering agencies and their employees, including
fire and emergency rescue personnel). See also Lipson v. Superior Court, 31
Cal. 3d 362, 366 (1982) (stating that the "firefighter rule" will not preclude
recovery by firemen injured as a result of an owner's failure to disclose presence
of hazardous substances).
65. See, e.g., BAJI, supra note 43, No. 12.76 (concerning Susceptibility of
Plaintiff); id. at 14.65 (Damages-Aggravation of Preexisting Condition); cf.
Bowler, supra note 35; Rosemarie Bowler et al., Amnestic Disturbance and
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Aftermath of a Chemical Release, 13
ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 455 (1998); Rosemarie Bowler & Ralf
Schwarzer, Environmental Anxiety: Assessing Emotional Distress and Concerns
After Toxin Exposure, 4 ANXIETY RES. 167 (1991).
66. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997). "Life in
organized society and especially in populous communities involves an unavoidable
clash of individual interests ... It is an obvious truth that each individual in a
community must put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and
interference and must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on
together." Id. at 1105.
67. It has been judicially recognized as a fact that manufacturing processes
that use hazmat have the potential of leading to accidents that cause serious injury
or death. Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988); cf. Ahrens v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
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taking precautionary steps before a hazmat event to
predetermine appropriate intervention to mitigate or ensure
against any risk of injury." In other words, the exact nature of
the risk to the public health or safety need not be known before
government takes preemptive action. Indeed, the fact that
government may not know the exact nature of the particular
risk is the very aspect of a hazmat release that makes it
prudent to issue precautionary warnings and initiate
mitigating measures. The taking of preventative or mitigating
measures for such an eventuality, as well as the identification
of specific populations which may be jeopardized, are
components of every hazmat release response plan.69
With advance knowledge of the consequences of a hazmat
release, ° public health and safety officials can plan and train to
maximize immediate and appropriate response action, and to
avoid placing the safety of residents of a community at an
unacceptable risk. A hazmat release response plan may
include mechanisms for warning residents of any potential or
actual danger of hazmat releases.
In the workplace environment, governmental hazard alerts
to workers regarding potential risks from exposure to toxic
materials are critical as well. 7'

The burgeoning knowledge

about the propensities of more and more substances by
manufacturers, employers, and the public, resulting from laws
mandating research and education on hazmat, the recognition
of the public and employees' "right to know" and corresponding
duties of disclosure, and the proliferation of hazmat lists, have
68. Such precautionary steps may be mandated by statute. See, eg., CAL.
§§ 25500-25543 (West 1999) (Hazardous Materials
Release Response Plans and Inventory Act); Washington v. County of Contra
Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
69. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25531.1-25534.1.
70. "Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment, unless permitted or authorized by a regulatory agency. See CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25501(s).
71. See, eg., ICN Pharms., Inc. v. State, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
A pharmaceutical manufacturer sought to enjoin the California Department of
Health Services ("DHS") from issuing a hazard alert (under CAL. LABOR CODE §§
6351, 6361-6362 (West 1999)) which warned pregnant health care workers to avoid
exposure to a medication manufactured by ICN. See id. Although the issue had
been rendered moot by the dissemination of the hazard alert throughout the state,
the court considered the appeal because the authority of "DHS to alert California
workers to potential risks from toxic materials and hazardous substances" is "a
matter of continuing public interest which is likely to recur." Id. at 95-96.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
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all brought about these critical governmental hazard alerts.72
The source of the hazmat release is relevant in this regard
because it is known, for instance, that chemical manufacturing
operations and refinery facilities handle a variety of toxic and
harmful substances which are used in their processes.78 Some
historically have released such substances into neighborhoods
surrounding their facilities.74
The mere threat of a hazmat release may trigger initial
emergency or precautionary responses which may be similar to
those invoked in actual releases. Apart from the magnitude of
a hazmat release and the extent of the communities potentially
affected thereby, various statutory enactments tend to ensure
government's intervention in hazmat releases. As repositories
of data on toxic materials and of the hazmat handled by these
facilities, government agencies are particularly equipped to
respond, direct, and coordinate a response to an emergency.
They can best determine the type of response necessary to
protect the public health and safety.75 Immediate notification to
public health and safety officials of a hazmat release or of a
threatened release is mandated by statute.7 ' Furthermore,
72. See, eg., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6361-6390; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25500-25531. As an example of the breadth of scientific data being accumulated in
the development of ambient air quality standards, required by sections 39000
through 39009 of the California Health and Safety Code, which created the State
Air Resources Board, basic data on toxicology, occupational health, and
epidemiological studies are consulted to determine the health effects of air
pollution. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Air Resources Bd., 37 Cal. 3d 502, 51216 (1984); see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 103875-103885 (establishing a
registry for the incidence of cancer correlated to environment and population); cf.
Kizer v. Sulnick, 248 Cal. Rptr. 712, 717-18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
government may subpoena medical and health data compiled by counsel and
physician hired by counsel).
73. See Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 384
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
74. For example, in 1987, the California Legislature enacted the "Air Toxics
'Hot Spots' Information and Assessment Act," which was predicated upon
significant findings that "75 percent of the United States population lives in
proximity to at least one facility that manufactures chemicals," and that an
incomplete survey had indicated that "nearly every chemical plant studied
routinely releases into the surrounding air significant levels of substances
proven to be or potentially hazardous to public health." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 44301(b). The Air Toxics Hot Spots law established a statewide
program for the inventory of air toxics emissions from individual facilities as
well as requirements for risk assessment and public notification of potential
health risks. See id. § 44360.
75. See id. § 25531;ICNPharms.,5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94.
76. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25507. The rule applies to railroad
incidents involving the release or threatened release of hazmat as well. See CAL.

2001]

HAZMAT AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

679

public health and safety officials responding to a hazmat
release are granted immunity for any injury or property
damage resulting from their efforts to abate a hazmat release
or hazard." Finally, public agencies responding to a hazmat
release are entitled to recover emergency response costs from
78
every person responsible for the release.
Thus, the action of government in issuing shelter in place
or evacuation orders79 in response to a hazmat release does not
break the chain of causation insofar as injuries suffered by the
public are caused by and are the direct and natural
consequence of tortious conduct. Although evacuation, shelter
in place, or other activity taken in response to a release
constitutes the very detriment that the public may later
complain of, government's response action (and the plaintiffs'
compliance therewith) is not a superseding cause that relieves a
defendant of any liability for its negligent or tortious conduct."
Even though government may have been mistaken (in that the
substances did not pose any risk of substantial harm) in issuing
a shelter in place or evacuation order, it does so in the exercise
of its emergency police powers as a precautionary step to
PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7672.5 (West 1999). In certain instances, a full report in the
form of a "followup emergency notice" may be required. See CAL. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE § 25507.1. Other laws extend the duty to report to physicians. In
the case of poisoning from a pesticide release/exposure, physicians and surgeons

who know or have reason to believe a patient is suffering from pesticide poisoning
are required by law to report the case within 24 hours to local health officials who

have the discretion to report the case to higher level health officials. See id. §§

105200-105225.
77. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25400; Washington v. County of

Contra Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 86558660 (Emergency Services Act). Also see the immunity provisions under the Tort
Claims Act which may apply, such as sections 815.2 and 820.2 of the California
Government Code (discretionary immunity), and section 855.4 of the California
Government Cede (public health immunity). Governmental immunity from tort

claims under the Tort Claims Act and the Emergency Services Act have been held
to apply to the state's conduct in aerial spraying of pesticides to eradicate the

Mediterranean fruit fly, causing damage to automobiles negligently sprayed with
the pesticide. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. State, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985); see also Macias v. State, 10 Cal. 4th 844 (1995) (manufacturers and

distributors of pesticide have no duty to warn public inconsistent with state's
warnings in conjunction with state's spraying of pesticides pursuant to Emergency

Services Act).
78. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009.6.
79. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 101375.

80. See BAJI, supra note 43, No. 3.79 (conduct of third party is a normal
consequence of the situation created by the defendant); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333
(West 1999).
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ensure the public's safety.8' A state's police power is rooted in
the law of necessity. The state's sovereign powers permit it to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare
of society. 2 Local governments have the same police power as
does the State of California under the Emergency Services
83
Act.
Clearly, hazmat reporting laws impose the duty to report
the presence of hazmat under negligence tort theory upon those
making, transporting, handling, storing, and otherwise dealing
with hazmat. Such a duty of compliance is owed to the public,
and a breach of that duty would "threaten physical injury, not
simply damage to property or financial interests."8 4
C.

Governmental Response Actions: Evacuation,Shelter in
Place, Traffic Interruptions,etc.
Government ordered responses to a hazmat release may
take the form of, among infinite other actions, shelter in place,
quarantine, evacuation, traffic intervention, detour, or closure.
Many communities have siren and other emergency
mechanisms in place to warn the populace of emergency
conditions or direct them to radios and television, as media
often play a significant role in alerting the public of toxic
releases and hazards.88
The appropriate response action certainly depends on the
hazmat situation. For example, shelter in place may provide a
81. See CAL. Govr CODE § 8550. The California Emergency Services Act
responds to a fundamental role of government to provide broad services in the
event of natural or manmade emergencies which result in conditions of disaster or
of extreme peril to life or property, with the objective of protecting and preserving
health, safety, life, and property. See id. Such conditions include air pollution (See
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 8558(c).), highway spills of hazmat (See CAL. GovVr CODE §
8574.17.), and the creation of a "toxic disaster" contingency plan to provide for a
more coordinated and effective response (See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 8574.16.). Time
permitting, temporary restraining orders may be obtained. See CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 731 (West 1999).
82. See Adkins v. State, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
83. See CAL. GOv'Tr CODE § 8630 (West 1999). See Davis v. Justice Court, 10
Cal. App. 3d 1002 (1970).
84. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 985 (1993).
However, a cause of action for private nuisance may be predicated upon mere
threat.
85. See McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (where mass media coverage of a toxic event was considered sufficient to
trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations, absent plaintiffs pleading
why they were not on notice); see also McGill v. M. J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 91 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
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level of protection from a toxic cloud, depending upon the
specific material and its concentration, and the specific
individual. If persons were evacuated through a toxic cloud,
where concentrations were highest, or visibility limited, far
more serious health problems might ensue. Shelter in place in
an airborne release can be supported on several bases: (1)
evacuation might expose more residents to the cloud of
chemicals, (2) logistical difficulty of evacuating numerous
residents, (3) the most appropriate method of avoiding damage
from the cloud, and (4) difficulties of predicting with any degree
of certainty what wind, rain, and humidity changes might
occur, thereby potentially exposing those who were being
evacuated to further hazard. Of course, such a response action
order would be a discrete determination, ideally based upon
data previously provided to local government by the releasor.
Under other circumstances, evacuation may be more
appropriate, depending on the nature of the release, which
could be chemical, radiologic, fungal, bacterial, or viral. Absent
governmental order, citizens in the path of an airborne hazmat
release might seek safety by sheltering in place in their own
homes, offices, or school rooms. They may do this as a
reasonable precautionary measure based upon their perception
of the danger, without awaiting safety warnings or instructions
from public health and safety officials." Depending on the
incident and hazards, evacuating or sheltering in place may be
necessary to prevent or mitigate plaintiffs damages." Costs
incurred to prevent or mitigate damages are recoverable.88 As
discussed, infra, evacuation can be immediate and temporary
or permanent. Each type of evacuation has different economic
impacts, based upon the danger or perceived danger.8 For
example, evacuation may preclude a worker from getting to
work with resulting wage loss, or it may mean the loss of equity
in one's home. Each circumstance understandably might
86. See BAJI, supra note 43, No. 4.40 (Duty of One in Imminent Peril); id. at
4.41 (Responsibility of One Causing the Perilous Situation). The latter
instruction provides that when a person, acting under the impulse of fear,
makes a reasonable effort to escape from a peril and injures himself, the injury
is deemed caused by the person creating the peril, even though after the event it
may appear that the effort to escape was unwise or that the person would not
have been injured if that effort would not have been made.
87. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1999).
88. See Barnes v. Berendes, 139 Cal. 32, 36 (1903) (finding expenses incurred
to minimize damages recoverable in a nuisance action).
89. See infra Part V.
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trigger severe emotional distress, depending upon the loss and
the victim.
IV. LIABILITY THEORIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON HAZMAT
DAMAGES

Potter and Cottle both emphasize just how critical pleading
or failing to plead viable theories and causes of action may be.
Pleadings where the only injury claimed from a hazmat
incident is emotional distress, nuisance, fraud and deceit,
trespass, and assault or battery, ultimately may prove as
effective, if not more, than when negligence or intentional
infliction of emotional distress is pleaded.
Where damages are sought for economic loss in toxic tort
cases, the disruption and endangerment of life and the
engendering of fear occasioned by the hazmat release require a
legal theory and a cause of action which are appropriate and
viable. 90
A defendant who has engaged in tortious conduct is liable
for all detriment caused, whether it could have been anticipated
or not.91 Detriment is a loss or harm suffered to person or
property.92 Juries are instructed that a prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to "damages in an amount that will reasonably
compensate plaintiff for all loss or harm" which amount shall
include "[r]easonable compensation for any fears, anxiety and
90. Equally important is finding and invoking insurance coverage, wherever
possible. See 9 HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE
LAW § 29:84 (2d ed. 1989). The government may even legislatively subpoena an
insurer's files relating to toxic pollution prior to litigation, in the interest of public
health and safety. See Connecticut Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 4th 807

(2000).
In certain instances, such as the insolvency, bankruptcy, or dissolution of
an insured tortfeasor, the insurance policy may be its only relevant and viable
asset which may be available for the exclusive use and benefit of all of the
victims who may elect to proceed against it, rather than file claims in the
defendant's insolvency proceeding. See Webster v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 3d
338, 351 (1989) (holding that insolvent insurance company was covered by
liability insurance). The same rule applies in a bankruptcy proceeding; a
plaintiff is not precluded from maintaining a lawsuit against a bankrupt
tortfeasor if the plaintiff's eventual recovery will be paid by the bankrupt's
insurer. See id. at 349; cf. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b) (West 1988). From time
to time, it is worth recalling the fundamental that every person who suffers
detriment from the unlawful act or omission of another may recover from the
person at fault compensation in money, called damages. See CAL. Civ. CODE §
3281 (West 1988).
91. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.
92. See id. § 3282.
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other emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff."93 Negligence
and nuisance causes of action both support claims for economic
loss, mental and emotional distress, and annoyance, even in the
absence of physical impact or injury. Liability for harmful
consequences outside one's property is not novel under the law
of negligence.94 In a nuisance action, the mere threat of harm to
others outside one's property is sufficient for liability to attach."
The dilemma that frequently confronts plaintiffs is
whether to pursue a cause of action based on intentional
conduct or to pursue a negligence cause of action.96 Although
the former might be covered by insurance, the latter is more
likely to be.9
In toxic tort cases, the choice of theories is particularly
problematic in cases where the injury is purely emotional
distress. As illustrated below, a preferred cause of action is
nuisance, where the primary focus is on the harm rather than
on the conduct of the defendant. Proof of the existence of the
nuisance will suffice.98
A. Negligence
The issue in a negligence action is whether, in the
management of his property, the owner or possessor of land has

93. BAJI, supra note 43, No. 12.88 (emphasis added).
94. See, eg., Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 372 (1981) (finding
owner liable for unstable, though natural, condition of land).
95. See County of San Diego v. Carlstrom, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961) (holding that presence in a residential community of an extreme fire hazard
creating a fear of fire in the lives of the people of that community is a public
nuisance).
96. See generally 4 BERNARD E. WK[N, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, PLEADING
§§ 356, 362 (3d ed. 1985). Of course, the theories would all depend on the facts of
each case, but inconsistent theories are allowed and both may be pleaded and an
election made at the appropriate time. See id. However, standing to sue may be
critical, particularly in a nuisance action, and plaintiffs status may be challenged
outright. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 430.10 (West 1999).
97. The challenge may be for the pleader to plead to the insurance. Coverage
under a personal injury provision of a policy is not determined by the damages
sought from the insured, but by the nature of the tort claims alleged against it. See
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 670, 678-79
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that company sued by governmental entities to
remediate groundwater and contamination emanating from a landfill had a
potential for coverage under policy insuring against liability for "wrongful entry or
eviction, or other invasion of the right of private occupancy," which would include
trespass and nuisance claims); MARGIE SEARCY-ALFORD, 1 A GUIDE TO ToXIc
TORTS § 5.01(2), at 5-4 to 5-7 (1992).
98. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 986 n.10 (1993).
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acted as a reasonable person under all circumstances. The
likelihood of injury to plaintiff, the probable seriousness of such
injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, the location
of the land, and the possessor's degree of control over the riskcreating condition are the factors the trier of fact considers in
evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct.99
1. Degree of Care-Amount of Caution Varies
The risk incident to the handling of fire, firearms,
explosives, highly inflammable matters, and corrosive or
otherwise dangerous fluids requires a great deal of care.' In
other words, the standard of care required of the reasonable
person when dealing with dangerous articles is so great that a
slight deviation will constitute negligence.' 01 Similarly, the
storage of hazmat in an isolated area or in an unpopulated
region may require less caution to constitute ordinary or
reasonable care, compared to the storage of similar hazmat in a
densely populated community or residential area. These are
factors that may require a hazmat handler to maintain
extraordinary safeguards in order to discharge its duty of
reasonable care.' 2
Defendants' duty of care is established by their exclusive
control and superior knowledge of their hazmat, how they store
it, its proximity to populated areas, their profiting from the
enterprise, and the use of dangerous instrumentalities under
their control. 103
2. Creatorof the Peril
A duty may arise from acts or omissions that created the
peril or increased the risk of harm to citizens. A breach of that
duty occurs by the failure to prevent the harm or warn citizens
of the existence of the peril.0 4 In determining whether a duty
99. See Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 30 Cal. 3d 358, 372 (1981) (finding owner
liable for unstable land even though condition is natural).
100. See BAJI, supra note 43, No. 3.41 (Specific Application of Duty in
Dangerous Activity).
101. See Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal. 2d 310, 317 (1955); BAJI,
supra note 43, No. 3.12 (Amount of Caution Varies).
102. See generally 6 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
TORTS §§ 762-766 (9th ed. 1988).
103. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 975-77; Lipson v. Superior Court 31 Cal. 3d 362,
371-73 (1982); Sprecher, 30 Cal. 3d at 369-70.
104. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 786 (1968) (finding creation of
foreseeable peril by placing teenager with criminal record and history of homicidal
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to protect or warn the public may be found where a hazardous
condition of property exists, "[tihe crucial element is control."'' °
The dispositive factor for determining liability is the person's
ability to control the dangerous activities or instrumentalities
which have the ability to cause harm. A person in control is
responsible for creating or maintaining the dangerous
conditions that caused the harm.
Of course, control is not the exclusive basis. The pivotal
elements for liability based upon interests in property are
ownership, possession, or control, which are disjunctive and
separate, each sufficient to establish a duty.0 6 The question of
control, however, is significant in identifying defendants
responsible for a hazmat release. For instance, in incidents
involving railroad tank cars not in transit, it is becoming a
common business practice to store hazmat in rail tank cars or
leave hazmat laden railroad cars unattended for various
lengths of time.0 7 In such a situation, several different parties
may be implicated if hazmat were released from the tank car,
including the hazmat manufacturer, the hazmat owner, the
hazmat transporter, the owner or user of the track, and the
hazmat storer (the railroad).
3. Negligence Per Se
What constitutes due care under the circumstances is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury in each case. However,
judicial decisions or statutes may prescribe the proper conduct
of a reasonable person in particular situations, and conduct
below that standard is negligence per se.
Safety laws require the reporting of the storage of
hazmat. °9
Petrochemical
refineries
and
chemical
tendencies, violence, and cruelty in foster home; conduct created a duty to warn
foster parents of the facts); see also Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 49
(1975) (finding affirmative act of defendant created an undue risk of harm).
105. Alcaraz v. Vece, 14 Cal. 4th 1149, 1159-62 (1997).
106. See id. at 1162.
107. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25503.7 (West 1999) (requiring the
notification of administering agencies of the use of railroad cars for hazmat
storage).
108. See 9 WITKIN, supra note 102, § 818, at 170; Anderson v. United States, 55
F.3d 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (Under California law, statutory remedies are additions
to, rather than deductions from, plaintiffs' general protection against general
harm.).
109. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25503.7; see also infra Part IV.D-F
(regarding fraudulent concealment of material facts).
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manufacturing facilities frequently discharge hazmat into the
ground, air, and water around them. A hazmat release itself,

and the resulting pollution and contamination, violates health
statutes and state regulations.11 ° In such cases, a presumption
of negligence may arise from the statutory violation."'
In certain instances, statutes or ordinances relating to
hazmat expressly state the applicable standard of care.112
Usually, however, the statute or ordinance prohibits certain
conduct and makes it a crime, without reference to civil
liability. It is then sometimes assumed that a cause of action
for negligence per se may be stated any time a legislative
enactment is violated. This is not the case. Disobedience of a
statute for which criminal sanctions are imposed does not
amount to civil negligence as a matter of law under all
circumstances.11 If the government enacted legislation for the
protection of others, the criminal penalty may imply that its
violation constitutes a breach of the duty of care. In this case,
the significance of the statute in a civil suit for negligence is its
formulation of a standard of care that the court may adopt in
the determination of liability." Accordingly, the court may
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479, 3480 (West 1999) (nuisance statutes); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42400.1 (negligent emission of air contaminants and as
owners of the source of air contaminants); id. § 41700 (discharge of air
contaminants which result in a public nuisance; air quality and water quality
standards set up by region/district as well as specific to the facilities); see also
Portman v. Clementina, 305 P.2d 963 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (finding violation of
section 3479 of the California Civil Code is nuisance per se); cf. Pintor v. Ong, 259
Cal. Rptr. 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
111. See Gallup v. Sparks-Mundo Eng'g Co., 43 Cal. 2d 1, 9 (1954). Negligence
may be presumed if (1) the defendant violated a statute; (2) the violation
proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; (3) the injury resulted from an
occurrence that the statute was designed to prevent; and (4) the plaintiff was one of
the class of persons for whose protection the statute was adopted. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 669 (West 1999); Selger v. Steven Bros., Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 544 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990).
112. See supra notes 99, 101 and accompanying text.
113. A statute that provides for a criminal proceeding only does not create a civil
liability; if there is no provision for a remedy by civil action to persons injured by a
breach of the statute, it is because the legislature did not contemplate one. See
Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72, 75 (1943); Nowlon v. Koram Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In a criminal prosecution, strict liability
may be imposed without proof of criminal intent or negligence under the public
welfare exception to the mens rea requirement. See People v. Chevron Chem. Co.,
191 Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (finding company criminally liable for
discharge of wastes into state waters).
114. As noted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the initial question is
always whether the legislation should be given any effect in a civil suit if there is
no provision for civil liability.
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accept the legislative determination that such conduct falls
below that required of a reasonable person."'
Because the government heavily regulates most hazmat,
prior to filing a complaint, counsel for a victim of a hazmat
incident or exposure should determine whether any statutes or
regulations apply to the defendants' conduct and, if
appropriate, allege that the defendants' conduct constitutes
negligence per se." 6 Furthermore, resort to environmental
statutes that have expanded dramatically since the 1970s
presents the advantage of drawing clearer lines of liability and
contamination than under traditional
remedies in a hazmat
117
common law theories.
In this context, the Potter court stated that negligence is a
tortious "cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is an
essential element.""' 8 The Potter court then expressly held,
"[tihat duty may be imposed by law, be assumed by the
9
defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship."" The
court then found that the defendant had violated "a duty
imposed upon it by law and regulation to dispose of toxic waste
only in a class I landfill and to avoid contamination of
In other cases it has been held that
underground water."'
violation of a statutory duty is a tort, which then allows the
recovery of all detriment proximately caused by the breach of

Since the legislation has not so provided, the court is under no
compulsion to accept it as defining any standard of conduct for
purposes of a tort action .... When the court does adopt the legislative

standard, it is acting to further the general purpose which it finds in
the legislation, and not because it is in any way required to do so.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1963-64).
115. See Clinkscales, 22 Cal. 2d at 75; see also Alechoff v. Los Angeles Gas &

Elec. Corp., 257 P. 569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927) (burning trash in manner or at times
prohibited by ordinance). See generally 6 WITKIN, supra note 102, § 820, at 173.
116. See Searcy-Alford, supra note 97, § 3.03. Many such statutes are expressly
cumulative.

See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 25512

(West 1999)

(regulating hazmat inventory reporting and hazmat release planning; states inter
alia, that "submission of any [hazmat] information required under this chapter

does not affect any other liability or responsibility of a business with regard to
safeguarding the health and safety of an employee or any other person").
117. See Nelson G. Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in
Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (1995).

118. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984 (1993) (citations
omitted).
119. Id. at 985.
120. Id. (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13050, 13350(a) (West 1999)).
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that duty, including emotional distress damages, 2 ' without
physical injury or impact. In rare instances, the statute
expressly provides for absolute liability upon the occurrence of
an event. For instance, section 3333.3 of the California Civil
Code states that a pipeline corporation operating as a public
utility is absolutely liable, without regard to fault, for injuries
and damages resulting from crude oil spilling from its pipeline.
B.

Trespass
Trespass is a violation of the exclusive right to possession
of property and involves the physical invasion of property.
Nuisance is distinguishable from trespass in that the mere
intentional entry on land may violate the right of exclusive
possession and create a right of action for trespass, while
conduct or activity cannot amount to a nuisance unless it
substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of the
land.'22 Thus, in Green v. General Petroleum Corp.,'2' residents
forced to leave their home following the blowout of an oil well
being drilled which resulted in oil, mud, and rocks falling on
their property, were entitled to "eviction" damages on a
trespass theory, even though the court found that the oil
company was not negligent in conducting the drilling operation.
In another case, the wrongful deposit of hazardous wastes on
property and failure to remove the wastes also constituted
trespass where it interfered with the exclusive possession of the
property.12
If there has been no physical or particulate matter passing
over or onto property, and the only interference in plaintiffs
use and enjoyment of his property is noise, light, or odor
emanating from another property, there is no trespass. 2 '
121. See, eg., Pintor v. Ong, 259 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
the duty of care arising from a statute is absolute and the court is not dealing with
a negligence action and its concepts of foreseeability).
122. See Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
123. 205 Cal. 328 (1928).
124. See Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 278 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(involving landowner who sued the former lessee of the property for trespass
caused by hazardous wastes deposited by the lessee who failed to remove or clean
up the waste as required by the lease).
125. See Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32 Cal. 3d 229 (1982) (involving noise
waves transmitted through the air which did not constitute trespass, but if merely
bothersome but not damaging, may be dealt with as a nuisance); see also San Diego
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 4th 893, 936 (1996) (finding that electric

2001]

HAZMAT AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

689

Once a cause of action for trespass is established, damages
anguish, discomfort, and
for emotional distress, mental
126
annoyance may be recovered.

C. Strict Liability-Ultra-hazardousActivity
Strict liability is liability without fault and may be
predicated upon product liability or ultra-hazardous activity.
As a general principle, one who carries on an ultra-hazardous
activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land, or
chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has
exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.'27 The theory of
ultra-hazardous activity is that certain activities create such a
serious risk of danger that it is justifiable to place liability for
the loss on the person engaging in them, regardless of lack of
culpability on his part. This liability is thus termed "absolute"
or "strict."'28 Traditionally, strict liability may be based on the
release of substances naturally on the land,'2 9 the "non-natural

use" of land, or the release of substances brought and stored on
Strict liability arises regardless of whether the
land.'
defendant knows the activity is abnormally dangerous.' The
elements of ultra-hazardous activity are:
1. the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to
the person, land, or chattels of others;
2. the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be
great;
3. the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care;

4. the extent to which the activity is not a matter of
and magnetic fields emanating from power lines, like noise, odor, or light, are
intangible phenomena that do not constitute trespass).
126. See Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 271-74 (1955);
Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 787-88 (1950).
127. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1979).

California adopted

the Restatement rule in Luthringer v. Moore where the Supreme Court noted that
"certain activities under certain conditions may be so hazardous to the public
generally, and of such relative infrequent occurrence, that it may well call for strict
liability as the best public policy." 31 Cal. 2d 489, 500 (1948). See also BAJI, supra
note 43, No. 6.60.
128. See 6 WITKIN, supra note 102, § 1228, at 662.
129. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333-34 (1928).
130. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-E. 265 (1866). See generally 6 WITKN,
supra note 102, § 1229, at 664.
131. See Garcia v. Estate of Norton, 228 Cal. Rptr. 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
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common usage;
5. the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where
it is carried on; and
6. the extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 132
Whether an activity is ultra-hazardous is a question of
law 133 determined not at the pleading stage, but at the time of
trial by the court.134 Familiar examples of ultra-hazardous
activities giving rise to strict liability include dangerous uses of
land, such as blasting,"5 fumigation using hydrocyanic gas, 36
and crop dusting with toxic chemicals.'3 7
Whether the
manufacture or maintenance of toxic chemicals is an ultrahazardous activity is not resolved in California."'
In one California case, the court imposed strict liability
against a seller of drain cleaner that contained sulfuric acid. 9
A court also imposed strict liability for damage to property
caused by the blowout of an oil well due to pressure of
underground natural gas.'4 ° In Green, discussed previously,
although the defendant was making a lawful use of its property
and no negligence was proven, the court held defendant liable,
referring to the maxim: "One must so use his own rights as not
to infringe upon the rights of another." 4'
Because liability for an ultra-hazardous activity is imposed
irrespective of the exercise of reasonable care and regardless of
fault, a person who engages in such activity is subject to a
narrower liability than would otherwise obtain. Strict liability
applies only to harm that is within the scope of the abnormal
risk that is the basis of the liability.14
132. See Ahrens v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1142-43 (Cal. Ct.

App. 1988); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§

520

(1965).

133. See Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
134. See SKF Farms v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
135. See Balding v. Stutsman, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
136. See Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489 (1948).
137. See SKF Farms, 200 Cal. Rptr. 497.
138. See Lipson v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. Rptr. 629, 639 (1982).
139. See Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp., 96 Cal. Rptr. 803, 806 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971) (concerning strict product liability).
140. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928).
141. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3514 (West Supp. 1997).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. e (1977). See also William L.
Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 403 (1942); Goodwin v.
Reiley, 221 Cal. Rptr. 374, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding drunk driving not an
ultra-hazardous activity and drunk driver not liable for victim's parents' emotional
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Consequently, emotional distress claims of parents who
were not percipient witnesses and who only learned of their
son's motorcycle accident after the fact were denied in Goodwin
v. Reilly, the court concluding that, even were the defendant
strictly liable for his driving, his liability would not extend
beyond that imposed for negligence."' Therefore, it seems the
limits imposed with respect to recovery for emotional distress
caused by negligence, e.g., plaintiff must be a "direct victim" or
a percipient "bystander" under the theory of Dillon v. Legg,'
would similarly restrict claims for emotional distress resulting
from an ultrahazardous activity.
Emotional distress damage has been held to be recoverable
However,
in an action predicated on a strict liability theory.'
economic loss damages may not be recoverable in a strict
liability (products liability) action.'46
Releases of toxic substances constitute ultra-hazardous
activity."' Other jurisdictions consider the mere storage or
dumping of hazardous substances onto land as an abnormally
One author urges that sound public
dangerous activity.'
policy would require that any release or disposal of toxic
substances, purposeful or accidental, be found an ultrahazardous activity for which strict liability should be imposed,
citing several decisions in other states which have imposed
liability on this theory. 9 Again, it is hard to comprehend any
public policy that would exonerate a tortfeasor, while leaving a
distress suffered from learning of accident).
143. Goodwin, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (liability for emotional distress would
not be imposed on a negligence theory because the parents were not percipient
witnesses under Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968)).
144. 68 Cal. 2d 728.
145. See Shepard v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977)
(allowing claim for emotional trauma resulting in physical injuries based upon a
strict product liability theory asserted against car manufacturer by plaintiffs who
witness a family member being thrown out of vehicle and dying).
146. See Huang v. Garner, 203 Cal. Rptr. 800, 809-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 496-500 (1948) (arguing that
asphyxiation from escape of toxic gas used to fumigate adjoining premises
constitutes an ultra-hazardous activity, since the use of such gas is perilous and
likely to cause injury to persons even though the utmost care was used, the
pesticide applicator knows or should know that injury might result, and the usage
is not common or carried on generally for the public).
148. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir.
1985) (arguing the mere maintenance of a site on which corroding tanks were
stored, holding hundreds of thousands of gallons of hazardous waste, constituted
an abnormally dangerous activity).
149. See 9 MILLER & STARR, supra note 90, § 29.83, at 212 n.8.
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victim without judicial recourse. Such a result would be on its
face unconstitutional and unlawful.'
D.

Fraudor FraudulentConcealment
According to one authority, an assertion of fraudulent
concealment at common law might be appropriate, "[i]f a
potentially harmful condition were concealed from a purchaser,
renter, lessee, etc., or from authorities responsible for the
environmental safety of neighboring residents." 5'
The
proposition is supported by the enactment of federal and state
"Community Right-to-Know" laws. The federal Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act," 2 enacted in
1986, imposes federal mandates upon state and local
governments regarding acutely hazardous materials. In 1986,
California also enacted "Chapter 6.95" of Division 20 of the
California Health and Safety Code, entitled "Hazardous
Materials Release Response Plans and Inventory." 5 ' In 1988,
the legislature added the "Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986 Implementation" to
Chapter 6.95.'
These federal and California statutes impose a broad duty
upon businesses handling hazardous materials to disclose to
local government material facts about their business. This
includes an inventory of hazardous materials, equipment,
safety processes, and storage, and general management of
hazardous materials, which are all necessary to assess the
hazards and the steps necessary to prevent or minimize the
risks of releasing hazardous materials.
The disclosure
requirements are met through various reporting requirements,
including site-specific business plans, risk management and
prevention programs, spill prevention and response plans, and
off-site consequence analyses of a release or potential release.'5 5
The reporting requirements of Chapter 6.95 are not limited to
fixed facilities, but extend to rail tank cars and maritime
vessels used as storage.'
Such reporting requirements do not
150. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997 & Supp.
1999); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.8 (West 1999).
151. JAMES T. O'REILLY, Toxic TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE § 6.08 (2d ed. 1992).
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25500-25521 (West 1999).
154. Id. § 25545.
155. See id. § 25503.4.
156. See id. § 25503.7.
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impose any duty upon the local government repository for such
reports, due to governmental immunity.'5 7
The "Right to Know" which is conferred upon the public
includes the right to be informed of the hazardous materials
which potentially affect the community, and the right to
participate158in decision making about risk reduction options and
measures.
Another statute imposing a duty to warn is the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, 159 also known as
Proposition 65. The warning requirement states: "No person in
the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally
expose any individual to a chemical known to the state to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and
to such individual, except as provided in
reasonable warning
1
6
10.",
25249.
Section
157. See Washington v. County of Contra Costa, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 646 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
158. In the legislative history the legislature stated:
The Legislature finds and declares that the public has a right to
know about acutely hazardous materials accident risks that may affect
their health and safety, and that this right includes full and timely
access to hazard assessment information, including offsite consequence
analysis for the most likely hazards, which identifies the offsite area
which may be required to take protective action in the event of an
acutely hazardous materials release.
The Legislature further finds and declares that the public has a
right to participate in decisions about risk options and measures to be
taken to reduce the risk or severity of acutely hazardous materials
accidents.
CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 25531.1 (emphasis added).
The public, however, has no general right of access to a business's trade
secret information. See, e.g., id. § 25511 (under Air Toxics Hot Spots program);
see also id. § 44346; Masonite Corp. v. County of Mendocino Air Quality
Management Dist., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (1996).
There are also drawbacks to allowing public access to business data and
practices, not the least of which is the possibility of abuse or misuse of
information, such as by criminal elements.
By law, chemical companies must provide "worst case" accident scenario
information to the EPA, but it is up to the agency's discretion on how such
information is made public. Last year, Congress directed the agency to weigh
the threat of possible terrorism against the public's right to know in making
that determination.
The chemical industry, the FBI, and some lawmakers complained that the
EPA was planning to make so many details available that terrorists could use
the information to single out a chemical plant and cause an accident. See EPA
ProposesStifling News on ChemicalAccidents, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER,
April 28, 2000, at A14.
159. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETYCODE §§ 25249.5-25249.13.
160. Id. § 25249.6; cf. the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
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There is no California case involving a hazmat release that
recognizes a toxic tort claim for fraud, deceit, or concealment
predicated upon a violation of these environmental statutes.
However, the possibility of asserting such causes of action
might be explored in an appropriate case. Emotional distress
damages have been allowed in cases involving fraudulent
conduct.'6 ' Furthermore, the decision in Potter, which allows a
lower than the "more likely than not" threshold of proof to
recover emotional distress damages without physical injury in
the event defendant is guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice, is
a factor which should not be overlooked.'62
E.

IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for
such emotional distress and bodily harm
63
that results from it.'

The elements of this tort are: "(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct."'64
An essential element of this intentional tort, which
distinguishes it from negligent infliction of emotional distress,
is that the defendant's outrageous conduct must be "directed at
the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the
defendant is aware.' , 65 Hence, even though the California
93-523, 888 Stat. 1660 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26).
161. See, e.g., Sprague v. Frank J. Sanders Lincoln Mercury, Inc. 174 Cal.
Rptr. 608 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
162. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 998 (1993); see
also Kerins v. Hartley 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 178-79 (1994) (discussing fraud but
not allowing emotional distress damages because of insignificant risk of injury
from exposure).
163. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 336-39 (1952); Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal.
2d 123 (1942). See also 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CML,
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIvIL § 12.70, at 158-60 (West 8th ed. 1994)
(defining intentional infliction of emotional distress); id. § 12.77, at 168 (defining
intentional and reckless).
164. Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991).
165. Id. at 903. Accord Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1002-03 (citing Christensen, 54 Cal.
3d at 903). Compare fraud, section 1709 of the California Civil Code, which
requires privity or direct action between the parties, with deceit, section 1711 of the
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Supreme Court in Potter believed that Firestone acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice in disposing hazardous wastes at a
landfill which contaminated a drinking water supply, the case
had to be remanded for trial. The court was not clear whether
Firestone actually knew of the plaintiffs and their consumption
of the contaminated water, or only realized that any person
who would consume the water would suffer emotional distress
upon discovering the facts. According to the California
Supreme Court, if it were the latter, the requirement that the
outrageous conduct be directed at the plaintiff was lacking.'66
However, this requirement ignores the alternative
"reckless" conduct as a basis for an intentional infliction of
emotional distress cause of action. Citing this requirement as
"misguided," a dissenting Justice Mosk stated that the Potter
majority opinion, requiring a defendant to direct his conduct at
the plaintiff or be aware of particular plaintiffs, is inconsistent
with the definition of "reckless." By definition, a reckless
person acts in disregard of the results of his conduct.'67 "A
defendant's conduct is in reckless disregard of the probability of
causing emotional distress if he has knowledge of a high degree
of probability that emotional distress will result and acts with
deliberate disregard of that probability or with a conscious
disregard of the probable results."'68 Thus, a tortfeasor, who
knows that an illegal deposit of hazmat at a dump would pose a
health hazard to anyone near the dump, acts in reckless
disregard to the probability of causing emotional distress.
In Potter, the majority found that Firestone "had a duty to
any person who might foreseeably come in contact with its
hazardous waste" and there was no claim "that plaintiffs were
not foreseeable victims of its negligence." 6 ' In fact, the trial
court in Potter found that "[diefendant had to realize that the
eventual discovery of such a [contaminated] condition by those
drinking the contaminated water would almost certainly result
in their suffering severe emotional distress."'7 ° The majority in
Potter also found that Firestone acted "in conscious disregard of
California Civil Code, which does not. See also 5 WITKIN, supra note 102, §§ 706709 (9th ed. 1998 & Supp. 2000).
166. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1002-03.
167. See id. at 1013-14 (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. 2 CoMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 12.77, at
168.
169. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 986.
170. Id. at 1000.
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the rights and safety of others,"171 and concluded that punitive
damages were proper.'
However, the majority determined it
was unclear whether Firestone was liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress because it was ambiguous
whether Firestone actually knew of the "particular plaintiffs."
In its effort to restrict emotional distress claims in a toxic
exposure context, the Potter court heightened the importance of
a defendant's ignorance in guiding its conduct and defense of an
action. Not surprisingly, the Potter court not only exalted the
defendant's ignorance of the facts, but also suggested that
ignorance of the law is an excuse in a toxic tort case.'
F. Assault or Battery
Mental and emotional suffering are frequently the
principal damages in many torts such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, defamation, nuisance, and trespass.'74 "A civil
action for assault is based upon an invasion of the right of a
person to live without being put in fear of personal harm."'76
Where one claims injury from a hazmat exposure, he may
assert the claim upon the theory of battery or harmful
contact.'76 The elements of battery are intent to cause harmful
or offensive contact, and such contact with the person of
another.177 "[B]attery is well suited to hazardous substance
litigation because it provides liability any time an actor
intentionally causes another to come into contact with an
offensive foreign substance."'78 As in most cases of intentional
171. Id.
172. See id. Compare Potter with Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328,
337-38 (1960) (defendant acted with intent to oppress and was held liable for
punitive damages and for the mental suffering caused to the plaintiff husband for
his discomfort and for his mental suffering in seeing his wife suffer, even in the
absence of physical injury).
173. See infra Part V.B.3.b.
174. See, eg., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338
(1952) (defining intentional infliction of emotional distress); Acadia, 54 Cal. 2d 328
(stating discomfort, annoyance, and mental suffering occasioned by fear for safety
of family caused by trespass); Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265
(1955) (stating discomfort and annoyance caused by nuisance); Sloane v. Southern
Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668 (1986) (showing humiliation due to a person's wrongful
ejection from a train).
175. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 648-50 (1989) (citing Lowry v. Standard
Oil Co., 63 Cal. App. 2d 1, 7 (1944)).
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
177. See id.
178. ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 124 (Janet S. Kole & Stephanie Nye eds., 2d

ed. 1999).
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conduct, emotional distress is a recoverable item of damage in
battery.
The long-accepted rule is that physical injury or impact
will support "parasitic" emotional distress damages. 179 In a
toxic exposure case, where no physical injury has manifested, it
is not clear whether subclinical and subcellular levels of
changes constitute physical injury to which emotional distress
damages may attach. 8° In one case, damage to the immune
system caused by a change to the bone marrow was deemed to
constitute physical harm sufficient to support a cause of action
for personal injury.' According to the court, the effect on the
bone marrow was a detrimental change in the physical
condition of the body which constitutes "loss or harm suffered
in person" under section 3282 of the California Civil Code. The
court offered no opinion as to whether the harm was sufficient
to support parasitic damages for fear of cancer.'
In another
case, the federal district court held that under California law,
injury 18
to the immune system is a form of actionable physical
injury. 3

The possibility for consideration of toxic exposure as a
physical impact, at least where no physical injury has
manifested, was eliminated in Potter, when the California
Supreme Court clearly stated that "a physical impact (i.e., a
toxic exposure), standing alone, is not sufficient for recovery of
179. See, eg., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 986 (1993).
The California Supreme Court, however, lamented that the physical injury
requirement permitted recovery no matter how trivial the injuries were, and that it
"encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." Id. at 987 (citing
Molien v. Kaiser 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930 (1980)). The utilization of the term "parasitic"
itself is somewhat pejorative and begs the question, which gives rise to the
argument that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress should
be recognized. See Kenneth W. Miller, Toxic Torts and Emotional Distress: The
Casefor an Independent Cause of Action for Fearof Future Harm, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
681 (1998); cf. Mary Donovan, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim for
Fearof Future Consequences?,41 UCLA L. REV. 1337 (1994).
180. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 982 ("No California cases address whether
impairment of the immune system response and cellular damage constitute
'physical injury' sufficient to allow recovery for parasitic emotional distress.").
181. See Duarte v. Zachariah, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88, 98-100 (1994) (finding that
overdose of negligently prescribed medication impaired ability of bone marrow to
produce blood platelets; platelets are the component of blood that causes the blood
to clot in response to a wound or cut).
182. See id. at 99 n.6.
183. See Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also MARGIE TYLER SEARCY, 1 A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS § 10.04(1)(b)
(1998).
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fear of cancer damages."'84 No doubt, there will be exceptions
carved out of such a generalization which fails to address and

distinguish between the infinite kinds of toxic exposures and
hazmat, and the many fears and anxieties besides fear of
cancer or other serious disease triggered by such exposures.'8 5
For instance, sulfuric acid is a strong corrosive acid which
can irritate the skin, eyes, nose, throat, and lungs upon
contact.'88 The physical pain suffered upon contact with the
acid should support a claim for substantial harm or
detriment.'8 7
People with preexisting conditions, such as
respiratory problems, illnesses, and difficulty breathing, may be
more sensitive to sulfuric acid. In one case, for example,
driving through a dense fog of sulfuric acid released from a
facility triggered a dormant cancer of the larynx in one victim,
requiring a laryngectomy, for which the chemical company was
held responsible.' 8
Additionally, harmful contact with hazmat intentionally
caused could arguably support a common law claim for
battery.18 Poisoning is a physical invasion of a person's bodily
184. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 996 n.16.
185. See generally National Institute of Mental Health, Facts About Anxiety
Disorders, <http'//www.nimh.nih.gov/anxiety/anxiety/idx_fax.htm> (identifying
and defining "panic disorder" and "post-traumatic stress disorder" as being two
"andety disorders"). "Anxiety disorders are the most common mental illness in
America: more than 19 million Americans are affected by these debilitating
illnesses each year." Id.
186. It causes rapid destruction of tissues and severe burns on contact with
bodily tissues of any kind. See Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d
361 (1953); Edwards v. Post Transp. Co., 279 Cal. Rptr. 231, 234 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (stating that "[tihe chemical is highly toxic, very reactive and will attack
most materials" such that "if it comes in contact with humans the resulting harm is
likely to be great"); Colson v. Standard Oil Co., 131 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976) (stating that plaintiff was sprayed with sulfuric acid from leaking pipeline).
187. See generally 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163,
§ 12.72, at 163.
188. See Hagy, 122 Cal. App. 2d at 373. Evidence showed that the chemical
released, sulfur trioxide, when combined with moisture, turns into sulfuric acid
and that the transformation occurs as well in combination with body fluids and
tissue juices, such as in the eyes, nose, mouth, and larynx. See id. at 364, 373-75.
189. Intent is essential only where the battery was committed in the
performance of a lawful act. However, if the battery was committed in the
performance of an unlawful or wrongful act, the intent of the wrongdoer to injure is
immaterial. See Lopez. v. Surchia, 112 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318 (1952). In other
words, if the wrongdoer did an illegal act which was likely to result in injury, he is
responsible for the resulting injury even though he did not intend to cause the
injury. See id.; see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 665 (West 1999) ("A person is presumed
to intend the ordinary consequence of his voluntary act."); cf. id. § 668 ("An
unlawful intent is presumed from the doing of an unlawful act."). These
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integrity and privacy because poisons are physical things, and
the poisoning of a person involves the putting of poisons in or
on the body.9 ' Contact for purposes of battery may include
contact with the person, his clothes, or anything in contact or
connected with the person.
In another "exposure" case, a plaintiff pricked with a
hypodermic needle feared contracting AIDS, and as a result
was found not to have sustained a physical impact or a direct
physical injury, and thus could not support a parasitic claim to
emotional distress.'92 Following the Potter rationale, the court
ruled that physical impact is not a relevant issue. Rather, what
is relevant is whether plaintiff suffered a physical injury, which
requires actual harm occurring when the hazmat "causes
detrimental change to the body." A needle prick, per se, was
held not to be such an injury. 193
Potter should be compared with other cases which
recognize that emotional distress caused by negligent conduct
may result in physical injuries, even when the initial emotional
distress did not result from physical impact or personal
injuries, and those cases where fright and emotional distress
cause injury to the nervous system and, therefore, cause a
compensable physical injury. Thus, a court held that fright and
emotional distress caused by spoken words alone, with no
contemporaneous physical impact, resulting in exacerbation of
In Cook v.
plaintiffs glandular condition, was compensable.'
Maier,'95 an automobile negligently driven collided with a trash
presumptions relate to civil actions. But see Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 998 (arguing the
exception to the "more likely than not" threshold should not focus on defendant's
intentional violation of the law).
190. See David W. Slawson, The Right to Protection From Air Pollution, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 672, 742 (1986); cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 244 (West 1999); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 108125 (West 1999).
191. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 9, at 39-40 (5th ed. 1984).
192. See Macy's Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
193. See id. But see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930 (1980)
(arguing that an erroneous diagnosis of syphilis entitles spouse of patient to
emotional distress damages suffered).
194. See Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 318-19 (1948) (concerning an
apartment owner and managers who screamed at a tenant who became frightened,
upsetting her glandular condition); Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668
(1896) (holding that injury to the nervous system, induced by fright, is injury to the
physical system and, therefore, a physical injury); see also 2 COMM. ON STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 12.81.
195. 33 Cal. App. 2d 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
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burner, fence, and the corner of plaintiffs house, causing rocks
and parts of the fence to be scattered around plaintiff. As a
result plaintiff feared for her safety. Even though there was no
physical impact, plaintiffs fright and shock caused her to lose
feeling in her arm, a physical injury which the court held
compensable. Interestingly, the Cook court opined that the
fright alone experienced by the plaintiff was not an injury that
could be the basis of a claim for damages.9
These cases
require emotional distress to be accompanied by some physical
manifestation in order to recover emotional distress damages.
After Cook, it was another sixty years before courts
recognized recovery for emotional distress damages alone in

similar situations. 197
G. Nuisance
A hazmat release may result in significant personal
injuries, or it may disrupt a community or endanger the
comfort, health, and safety of the public. These conditions or
harm constitute a detriment 99 and a nuisance. When the
detriment is to a considerable number of persons, businesses, or
property, it is a public nuisance.9
A nuisance is statutorily
defined as:
Anything which is injurious to health... or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage

196. See also Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 184 (1931)
(describing the collision between a truck and a street car, which propelled the truck
and caused it to smash into the front of a building where the plaintiff was; the
plaintiff viewed the incident and although he was not hit by the truck, he feared for
his own safety). Damages for personal injuries were awarded for the extreme
nervousness suffered and the resulting headaches, sleeplessness, loss of weight,
and other disturbances. See id.
197. See Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(involving a similar claim of a woman who feared for her safety when a
negligently driven automobile was propelled toward her after colliding with
another vehicle, but did not actually strike her; the plaintiff did not claim any
physical injury, but the court nevertheless allowed her emotional distress
claim); see also Gutierrez v. Alvarado, 101 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that emotional distress damages are recoverable by plaintiff who suffered
a miscarriage and believed, albeit erroneously, that her miscarriage was caused by
defendant shooting (blanks) at her feet a month before the miscarriage).
198. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3281 (West 1997).
199. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-3480; CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 41700 (West 1997).
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or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or
river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park,
square, street, or highway .... 200

One treatise states: "Paraphrased, a nuisance is a
condition which adversely affects health, morals, or enjoyment
of property, or which hinders free movement of people or things
from place to place."0 '
Nuisance law focuses on the harm suffered by a person or
the public, not on the conduct causing it.2 °2 It is determined by
the consequences of defendants' conduct, regardless of whether
defendants' activities were conducted with due care." 3 As aptly
stated in one case, "it is immaterial whether the acts be
considered willful or negligent; the essential fact is that,
whatever be the cause, the result is a nuisance. " "' Thus, a
nuisance has been described by one court as "not a separate tort
but a species of damage."0 5
The amount of damages
recoverable in a nuisance action is governed by sections 3281
and 3333 of the California Civil Code °6 and include all damages
suffered whether anticipated or not.0 7 Furthermore, when the
nuisance is intentional, exemplary damages may be awarded.2 °8
By definition, a hazmat release that threatens a person or
the public constitutes actionable nuisance. An actual release
may result in pollution of the air, water, or soil.209 The essence
200. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1997) (emphases added).
201. HARRY D. MILLER & MARVIN B. STARR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE: THE
LAW OF NUISANCE § 320.01, at 320-23 (1984) (emphasis added).
202. The attributes of nuisance have been described in three different ways:
1. A human activity or physical condition, which harms or annoys
others, which may include indecent conduct or an obnoxious odor;
2. The actual harm related to the human conduct or physical condition,
which may include the discomfort felt by a person sensitive to the
objectionable odors; and
3. The conduct or annoying condition and the resulting injury.
See Conrad G. Tuohey, Toxic Torts as Absolute Nuisances, 16 W. ST. U. L. REV.
5, 27-28 (1988).
203. See Shields v. Wondries, 154 Cal. App. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
204. Snow v. Marian Realty, 212 Cal. 622, 625-26 (1931).
205. Van Zyl v. Spiegelberg, 82 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
206. See Coats v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 1 Cal. App. 441 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1905).
207. See id.; CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1997).
208. See Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
209. The discharge of contaminants into the air so as to cause a nuisance or air
pollution is prohibited by statute. See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 41700
(West 1996), which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in Section 41705, no person shall
discharge from any source whatsoever such quantities of air
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of a private nuisance is an interference with the use and
enjoyment of a property right. Therefore, the fact that plaintiff
may have suffered a personal injury or an interference with
some purely personal right is not sufficient to support an action
based on private nuisance.21 ° There must be an interference
with the use and enjoyment of a property interest. 1
There are countless ways to interfere with the use and
enjoyment of land, including physical interference with the
condition of the land itself and disturbance in the comfort or
conveniences of the occupant including his peace of mind. Mere
threat of a future injury that is a present menace and that
interferes with enjoyment of property is a nuisance.212
However, where the injury caused by a nuisance consists only
of emotional distress, discomfort, annoyance, or other
inconvenience, a cause of action for private nuisance may not be
asserted.212
To be actionable as a private nuisance, the
contaminants or other material which cause injury, detriment,
nuisance, or annoyance to any considerable number of persons or to the
public, or which endanger the comfort, repose, health or safety of any
such persons or the public, or which cause, or have a natural tendency
to cause, injury or damage to business or property.
See also CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13000-14050 (West 1992); id. § 13050(m). Water
pollution occurring as a result of treatment or discharge of wastes in violation of
sections 13000 et seq. of the California Water Code is a public nuisanceper se. See
Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993); see also CAL. WATER CODE § 13050(m); Selma Pressure Treating Co. v.

Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); Newhall
Land & Farming Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (finding contamination of groundwater
is a public nuisance); cf. Beck Dev. Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d 518, 551-54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that underground oil contamination of
private property which is unlikely to migrate into groundwater and invade public
water supply is not a public nuisance).
210. See Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971) (finding personal injury from air pollution does not support a claim for
private nuisance).
211. See id.; see also Neuber v. Royal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 596 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948).
212. See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946);
see also Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328 (1960); cf. San Diego Gas &
Elec. v. Daley, 253 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (in eminent domain
proceeding, loss in property value as a result of public perception of harm from
high energy lines is admissible).
213. For instance, family members, workers, or students ordered evacuated
from their home, place of work, or schools during a hazmat release may not have
property rights interfered with but nevertheless are harmed by the release. See
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND WATER

§

2.4, at 43

(1986). Such evacuations or other emergency response may result in wage losses,
temporary childcare costs, and other detriment incident to the response. Whether
these same family members, workers, and students may bring a public nuisance
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discomfort or emotional distress must be tied to an invasion of a

property right, either ownership or leasehold."4 The possibility
that a lawful facility may some day become a nuisance is not
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for private nuisance
when there is no actual interference with a property right. For
instance, the installation of above-ground fuel storage tanks
near offices or homes, while they may engender fear of future
injury from an explosion or other accident, do not interfere with
any property right and, therefore, do not give rise to a private
nuisance.215
A public nuisance is one that affects an entire community
or neighborhood at the same time, or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted on individuals may be unequal.21" It comprehends an
act or omission that interferes with the interests of the
community or the health, comfort, and convenience of the
general public.21 ' It is not dependent on disturbance of any
rights in land but is based on interference with rights of the
community at large.1 8 The Second Restatement of Torts
identifies five categories of public rights that may constitute
public nuisance when unreasonably interfered with: the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or
the public convenience."9
An example of a public nuisance is presented by the
activities of a street gang which menaced a neighborhood by
congregating on sidewalks, lawns, and in front of residences at
all hours of the day and night. The members were talking loud,
openly drinking and smoking marijuana, taking over the
action when the hazmat release affects an entire neighborhood or a considerable
number of persons, i.e., whether they can maintain a public nuisance action for
damages for the emotional distress, discomfort, or annoyance suffered is
problematic.
214. See Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Venuto
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
However, allegations of mere residency, as opposed to a property interest, are not
sufficient. See id.
215. See Koll-Irvine Ctr. Property Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. Petrolane, Inc., 162 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980). The Koll-Irvine decision distinguished County of San Diego v.
Carlstrom, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961), which involved a public nuisance
action brought by county officials on behalf of the community.
216. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1997).
217. See Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
218. See id.
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) (emphasis added).
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streets, and impeding traffic.22 ° The court described the
inconvenience and constraints on movement to the community
residents, "[tihe people of this community are prisoners in their
own homes. Violence and the threat of violence are constant.
Residents remain indoors, especially at night. They do not
allow their children to play outside. Relatives and friends
refuse to visit.... "" In concluding that the activities of the
street gang constituted a public nuisance, the court remarked,
"The freedom to leave one's house and move about at will, and
to have a measure of personal security is implicit in 'the concept
of ordered liberty' enshrined in the history and basic
constitutional documents of English-speaking people." '
As this case shows, the mere threat of harm is sufficient for
liability to attach.' However, to support an action on a public
nuisance, a plaintiff must show more than a mere possibility of
future injury. A single plaintiff must demonstrate that an
actual and unnecessary hazard to the public is present.224 In a
public nuisance, where the public at large is placed at a risk, no
interest in real property is required.22 However, in order to
maintain a public nuisance action for damages, a plaintiff must
suffer harm of a different kind from that suffered by members
of the public."' It is not enough that a plaintiff suffers the same
220. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997).
221. Id. at 1100.
222. Id. at 1125. See also Lew v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993).
223. See County of San Diego v. Carlstrom, 16 Cal. Rptr. 667 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961) (holding that the presence in a residential community of an extreme fire
hazard creating a fear of fire in the lives of the people of that community is a public
nuisance); see also Lew, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46 (regarding fear for their own and
family's safety by neighbors of an apartment maintained as a "drug house").
224. Underground oil contamination of private property that is unlikely to
migrate into groundwater and invade public water supply is not a public
nuisance. See Beck Dev. Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) "[U]nlike a private
nuisance, a public nuisance does not necessarily involve interference with use and
enjoyment of land."
226. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3493 (West 1997) (authorizing a private party to
bring an action for damages on a public nuisance if it is specially injurious to
himself). This statute has been interpreted strictly so as to forbid a city from
recovering damages on a public nuisance action as a result of damages to utility
poles, conductors, and fixtures damaged during a fire, but it may recover such
damages on its negligence cause of action. See City of Los Angeles v. ShpegelDimsey, Inc., 244 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); cf. Selma Pressure
Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (interpreting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 1980); the state may recover
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inconvenience, is deprived of the same enjoyment, or is exposed
to the same threat or injury as everyone else exercising the
same public right.
The Second Restatement of Torts states that an individual
with a private nuisance cause of action suffers injury different
in kind from the public, which allows him to bring an action for
public nuisance as well. 227 Thus, where the nuisance is a
private as well as a public nuisance, there is no requirement
that the plaintiff suffer damage different in kind from that
Section 821C of the
suffered by the general public.225
Restatement (Second) of Torts identifies some of the
particularized harm different in kind and degree from that
suffered by the public:
1. Physical harm.229 In a case in this category, plaintiff
was driving on a highway adjacent to which county
employees were abating mosquitoes by spraying a fog-like
gas which drifted onto the highway where it obstructed
the vision of motorists. Because of the obstruction,
plaintiff had to stop her car and get out on the highway
where she was run over and injured. Her injuries were
special damages different in kind from the obstruction in
the highway that interfered with the rights of the general
public. 230
231
2. Private nuisance.

3. Interference with access to land.2 2
4. Pecuniary loss.

233

For example, lost business profits,

damages for pollution of groundwater resulting from discharge of hazardous
wastes).
227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §
3493.
228. See Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d
377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. d.
230. See Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 7 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1959).
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. e; see also Lew v.
Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 43, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (involving an
apartment maintained as a drug house that affected neighbor's use and enjoyment
of property); Wade v. Campbell, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (involving a
dairy farm operation resulting in noxious odors, dust, and water pollution); Freitas
v. City of Atwater, 16 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (involving pollution
affecting private fishery).
232. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. f; see, eg., Phillips v.
City of Pasadena, 27 Cal. 2d 104 (1945); Cushing-Wetmore Co. v. Gray, 152 Cal.
118, 121 (1907).
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which can be established by customers' loss of access to a
business.
5. Delay and inconvenience causing plaintiff to incur
special expense of a different kind.3
Mere delay or
inconvenience caused by the obstruction of a highway is
not particular harm of a different kind even though it may
be greater in degree with other members of the
communities. As explained in the Restatement, normally
there may be no difference in the interference with one
who travels a road once a week and one who travels it
every day. However, if a person traverses the road a
dozen times a day he nearly always has some special
reason to do so, and that reason will almost invariably be
based upon some special interest of his own, not common
to the community. 235
Thus, the critical issue is whether a private party has
requisite standing to bring a public nuisance action based upon
an injury different in kind. Arguably, every individual will
respond somewhat differently to a mass hazmat exposure, and
such differentiations might suffice. 36
Although the remedies for public nuisance include a civil
action, presumably for damages, abatement, or an indictment,
the code restricts their availability.2 37 A public nuisance will be
a basis for tort remedies of personal harm or property damage
only if the plaintiff can show special injury to himself of a
character different in kind, not merely in degree, from that
suffered by the general public.2 8 When such an action is
brought, it is only to seek redress for the harm suffered by the
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C cmt. h; see also Union Oil
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (commercial fishermen sued for
losses caused by a negligent spill); Phillips, 27 Cal. 2d 104 (allowing owner of a
mountain resort to sue for damages on a nuisance theory for loss of patronage as a
result of the city barricading a road which served as an ingress/egress to the
resort); Gardner v. Stroever, 89 Cal. 26 (1891). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra
note 191, § 90, at 649.
234. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 821C

cmt i.

235. See id. cmt. c.
236. Individuals differ in their responses to toxic substances. The underlying
causes of individual variability include: age, sex, and genetic makeup; lifestyle and
behavioral factors, including nutritional and dietary factors; alcohol, tobacco, and
drug use; environmental factors; and preexisting disease. See, eg., NICHOLAS A.
ASHFORD & CLAUDIA S. MILLER, CHEMICAL ExPOSURES 5-10 (1991). But see
Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
237. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3491 (West 1997).
238. See Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 799 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993).
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plaintiff himself, not by the public. In other words, even though
the public is harmed, it does not have any means of redressing
its harm. 39
In a hazmat incident which causes fear, anger,
inconvenience, and disruption in the lives of members of a
community, those who can show special injury such as physical
harm or interference in the use of their property as a result of
the release can bring an action for public nuisance. Ironically,
the rest of the public who have no property rights interfered
with or who do not suffer any physical harm, but nevertheless
suffer the general harm which gives rise to the nuisance, have
240
no standing to seek damages in an action for public nuisance.
The public may possibly benefit when an individual brings
nuisance action on its behalf, such as a public official
public
a
suing to abate a public nuisance 41 or a class action by a private
individual.242 In a class action, the prerequisite special injury or
community interest requirement might militate against the
class action device.243 When an individual alleges that all
239. See William Prosser, PrivateAction for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV.
997, 997-1027 (1966). Prosser states that injury to health is a special injury not
common to the public but reiterates that individual recovery will not be allowed (in
1966) where the health of the entire community is threatened (citing Baltzeger v.
Carolina Midland Ry., 32 S.E. 358 (S.C. 1899)). See id. at 1012. In Venuto v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), three
residents of Santa Clara County who sued a manufacturer to abate air pollution,
alleging that the health of citizens of the county had been injured, and that they
suffered severe respiratory ailments, could not show a sufficient injury different in
kind to confer standing. See id.
240. For instance, an employer who lost the services of employees who were
prevented from getting to work or who were required to leave their place of work as
a result of a hazmat release could bring an action for public nuisance for the lost
services in George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337, 341 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979), but the employees themselves who experienced emotional distress,
discomfort, and annoyance as a result of the release, like the rest of the general
public, could not bring a public nuisance action.
241. A public entity cannot assert a claim for damages on a public nuisance
theory on its own behalf, and certainly not on behalf of others. See CAL. Civ. PROC.
When a public official sues, it does so in its
CODE § 731 (West 2000).
representative capacity to abate a public nuisance to protect the public interest.
See id.; Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal.
Rptr. 596, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). When a nuisance action is brought under
section 731 of the California Civil Procedure Code by a public official, abatement is
the sole remedy and damages are not permitted under that statute. See People ex
rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 114 Cal. App. 3d 923, 930-32 (1981).
Response costs incurred and statutory penalties are separate and are recoverable.
See supra Part IHI.
242. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2000).
243. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Cal. Ct.
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members of the class suffered special injuries, a class action for
public nuisance cannot be maintained.244 For example, in
Diamond v. General Motors Corp., the plaintiff sought to
represent all residents of Los Angeles County who had been
damaged by air pollution, alleging claims of negligence,
nuisance, trespass, and strict liability.245 The Diamond court
noted that the case consisted of an aggregation of individual
tort claims of persons classified only by their residence within a
political subdivision of the state. It affirmed the trial court's
finding that "the number of parties, the diversity of their
interests, and the multiplicity of issues all in a single action
'
would make the proceeding unmanageable."246
The court also
noted that plaintiffs allegation that each member of the class
had suffered special injury in that each "is prevented from
enjoying his own unique property" (a private nuisance) was
incompatible with a class action for public nuisance.
This concept of common-special damages seems to conflict
with the traditional concept of special or particular damage in
private nuisance cases. Dean Prosser has said:
A considerable class of persons, such as landowners near a
factory who are inconvenienced in their dwellings by its
dust, smoke and odors, may sue and recover. It is only
when the class becomes so large and general as to include
all members of the public who come in contact with the
nuisance, that the private action will fail.247
Thus, it would seem that the aggregation of individual tort
claims of persons harmed by a public nuisance in a class action
is not feasible.2 48 Furthermore, a mass tort action for personal

App. 2000), review granted, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal. 2000).
244. See Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642-43 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971); see also City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 447, 459 (1974)
(finding that a class action cannot be maintained where each member's right to
recover depends on facts peculiar to his case).
245. See Diamond, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
246. Id. at 642.
247. Id. (quoting Prosser, supra note 239, at 1009).
248. For instance, an association of commercial property owners and individual
owners could not maintain a public nuisance action against a county for building
300,000 gallon fuel storage tanks on an airport runway close to the industrial park
owned by plaintiffs. The claimed damages of extreme mental anguish and fear for
the destruction of their lives or property in the event of an accident which would be
catastrophic, diminished the value of their properties, and risk of higher insurance
premiums, according to the court, applied to all homes and businesses in the area
of the airport. The proximity of plaintiffs to the runway merely exposed them to a
higher degree of damages, but not a different kind. See Koll-Irvine Ctr. Property
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injuries cannot be certified as a class action. 49 Tort claims for
emotional distress damages also have been denied class
treatment. 5 ' The major elements in tort actions for personal
injuries, emotional distress, and even real property damage25 '
are liability, causation, and damages. Issues of comparative
fault and assumption of risk vary widely in individual cases,
which is why courts are reluctant to process mass personal
injuries as class actions.252 The preferred procedure for
Owners Ass'n v. County of Orange, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 666 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
249. See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1122-25 (1988); Kennedy v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 742-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Brown
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 198 Cal. Rptr. 916, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Rose v.
Medtronics, Inc., 166 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
In federal court, an action may not be settled on a classwide basis unless
the requirements for litigating the case as a class action are met. See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc. 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (concerning
certification of mass tort claims of plaintiffs with asbestos-related claims); Sala
v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 120 F.R.D. 494, 498-500 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(certification of personal injury claims resulting from trail derailment). See
generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Furthermore, in federal court an action may
not be settled on a classwide basis unless the requirements for litigating the
case as a class action are met. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 609 (1997).
250. See Fuhrman v. California Satellite Sys., 231 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986). In finding a class action complaint alleging claims for emotional
distress is inappropriate for class certification, the Furhman court stated:
[T]he injury alleged in each of the first six causes of action is 'severe
intimidation, shock, distress, humiliation, alarm, frustration,
harassment, embarrassment, defamation and disruption... Perhaps
no cause of action is less susceptible to a class action than one for
infliction of emotional distress. Recovery in each case necessarily
depends on the particular characteristics of each plaintiff.
Id. at 425. See also Altman v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 148 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103-04
(Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (dismissing unnamed class members on grounds that no
community of interest existed because emotional distress claims required "complex
proof unique to each member on his damages for loss of peace of mind"); Stilson v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 104 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (striking
class allegations from complaint alleging mental anguish damages).
251. In City of San Jose v. SuperiorCourt, 12 Cal. 3d 447 (1974), the court found
a class action "incompatible with the fundamental maxim that each parcel of land
is unique." City of San Jose, 12 Cal. 3d at 461. In addition, the court observed that
claims for diminution in property value depend on an "extensive examination of the
circumstances" concerning each plaintiffs property. Id. at 461. See also Diamond
v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
252. See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1122-25 (1988). In denying
class certification in this mass-tort action, the court in Jolly stated:
As a general rule . . . so called 'mass accidents' or 'common disasters'
are considered not appropriate for class litigation. This
inappropriateness is based upon the overwhelming uniqueness of the
issues stemming from the necessity for the trier to hear and determine
individually each victim's injuries, his suffering, financial loss, etc.
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disposition of such causes is to aggregate them by consolidation
or coordination. 5 3
Despite the limits on standing imposed by nuisance law,
there appears to be an advantage in pleading nuisance liability
over a cause of action based upon other tortious conduct, such
as negligence, particularly in releases that result in pollution
and contamination. For example, according to the Potter court,
in the absence of physical injury or impact, a defendant's
negligence will support an award of emotional distress damages
only if a claimant fits within the rubric of a "direct victim."254
Thus, whether an individual can recover damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress is dependent upon traditional
tort analysis and the elements of duty, breach, causation, and
Thus even though a common question may be involved (e.g., the
defendant's tort) the matter is not suitable for a class action.
Id. at 1121.
253. See id. at 1103; Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 166 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (suggesting consolidation). A small claims court may hear an action in
nuisance. See City of San Francisco v. Small Claims Court, 190 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In this case, judgment was in favor of numerous individuals
who filed in small claims court 183 consolidated claims alleging the city airport
noise constituted a nuisance (Greater Westchester Homes Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86 (1979) causing damages to each claimant in the maximum
jurisdictional amount of the court (then $750.00). See City of San Francisco, 190
Cal. Rptr. at 342. The "mass filing" of claims and their consolidation did not
present any problem even though the defendant faced a potential liability of over
$135,000. See id. at 345. The jurisdictional amount limitations apply to each
plaintiffs individual claim; in a consolidated action, the fact that the aggregate
amount of the claims is greater does not create a jurisdictional defect. See id.
However, in a class action, the claims of individual class members are aggregated
in determining the amount in controversy. See Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 15
Cal. 3d 853, 861 (1976). Hence, class actions are usually within superior court
jurisdiction. See id.
In other jurisdictions, the liability issue in a hazmat incident is considered
common amongst class members and predominating over damage issues. See,
e.g., Mcgee v. Shell Oil Co., 659 So. 2d 812, 815 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing
residents evacuated as a result of a sulfuric acid release, who claimed damages
for inconvenience as well as personal injuries, to bring a class action because
"the issues of liability common to class members predominate over the
questions of damage assessment affecting individual members"); see also
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wollenmann, 390 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979) (finding that even if damages would have to be proved for each class
member, a larger, predominant issue was involved, i.e., the negligence of the
railroad); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 471 (1986) (finding the
'state of the art" defense common to all plaintiffs in certified class action for
asbestos related mass-tort claims); Sala, 120 F.R.D. 494, 498-99 (allowing
victims of train derailment to sue as a class because it is likely plaintiffs will
sue under the same theories of liability and defendant will mount the same
defenses even if the claims were pursued independently).
254. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993).
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damages.255
The foregoing limits imposed with respect to recovery for
emotional distress caused by a defendant's negligence do not
apply when the distress is the result of a defendant's
commission of the distinct torts of trespass, nuisance, or
conversion.256
Nuisance liability may arise from conduct that is not
otherwise tortious. 257

Nuisance focuses on the injury or

condition itself, rather than on the culpability of conduct
causing it, and the exercise of due care will not protect against
the finding of a nuisance."' At common law, a public nuisance
was a criminal offense and a tort. Where the conduct creating a
public nuisance violated a statute, liability was strictly imposed
even though the conduct was "purely accidental and
unintentional."259 Some authorities contend, however, that a
nuisance may result only from intentional, negligent, or ultrahazardous activities.60
With regard to a nuisance, damages for annoyance and
discomfort may be recovered without showing that the nuisance
caused actual damages to plaintiffs property, his person, or his
family. 261 In contrast, in negligent infliction of emotional
distress actions, physical injury, physical impact and, more
recently, toxic exposure and resultant probability of future
injury, are required to provide a semblance of genuineness to
255. See Klein v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 37 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
256. See, eg., Gonzales v. Personal Storage, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473, 479 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (finding a tenant of a storage facility entitled to emotional distress
damages for the mishandling of her property on a conversion theory, but not on
negligence); cf. Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39, 45 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970) (holding that a plaintiff who lost six rings entrusted to defendant for
resetting was entitled to damages for the shock (from being told of the loss) to her
nervous system as a result of defendant's negligence).
257. See Tuohey, supra note 202, at 27-28.
258. See Snow v. Marian Realty Co., 212 Cal. 622 (1931); see also Green v.
General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928).
259. Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 200
Cal. Rptr. 575, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 812 cmt. e (1979)).
260. See, eg., Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist., 253 Cal. Rptr. 470, 474
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Prosser, supra note 239, at 1003 ("Liability may
rest upon any of the three familiar tort bases: intent, negligence, or strict
liability.").
261. See Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328 (1960); see also Kornoff v.
Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 272-75 (1955); Smith v. County of Los
Angeles, 214 Cal. App. 3d 266, 287-88 (1989).
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claimed emotional injury.
Numerous factors are taken into consideration in
determining the existence of a nuisance. The law is one of
degree; a reasonable use under one set of facts might be
unreasonable under another.26 2 Discomfort and annoyance are
elements of damage proximately caused by a nuisance. 6 ' One
complaining of a mere annoyance "must submit, in the interest
of the public generally, to the discomfort usually incident to the
circumstances of the place and the trades carried on around
him." 4 The annoyance must be real. 65
There is a dichotomy between conditions that injure health
and those that create personal discomfort. Under the law of
nuisance, where personal discomfort (as opposed to injured
health) is the basis of the complaint, the test of liability is the
effect the interference has on the comfort of normal persons of
"ordinary sensibilities."266 Hence, persons with allergies and
preexisting respiratory disorders aggravated by air pollution
are historically unable to assert a public nuisance claim.267
In a negligence cause of action, the court requires more
than an allegation of a "subjective state of discomfort" to

262. See Hassell v. City of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 2d 168, 170 (1938) (the pig in
the parlor analogy). "A nuisance, it has been said, may consist of the right thing in
the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard." Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
263. See Acadia, 54 Cal. 2d at 328.
264. McIntosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924); see also People
ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997).
265. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1090. An example is provided by Green v. General
Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 337 (1928), where the court awarded "eviction"
damages for the annoyance and discomfort suffered by residents forced to leave
their home following the blowout of an oil well being drilled which resulted in oil,
mud, and rocks falling onto their property, although the oil company was not
negligent in conducting the drilling operation.
266. See Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971).
267. On the other hand, in a negligence action, the negligent actor is responsible
for the exacerbation of any preexisting condition. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 461 (1976); see also Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d
361 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953) (concerning latent laryngeal cancer stimulated by
exposure to sulfuric acid fog); BAJI, supra note 43, No. 14.65 (concerning damages
for aggravation of preexisting condition in a negligence cause of action). In Acadia
a mentally unstable plaintiff suffered a relapse and the court held it immaterial
whether the defendant knew of the existing condition, stating that, "a tortfeasor
must take his victim as he finds him." Acadia, 54 Cal. 2d at 338. See also Deevy v.
Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 123 (1942) (preexisting heart condition aggravated by assault
and battery).
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recover emotional distress damages.268 Emotional distress must
be serious. That is also true in hazmat cases.6 9
However, the issue of standing to assert either a private or
a public nuisance claim is critical.
The special injury
requirement for bringing a public nuisance cause of action is a
severe limitation on the public's remedies. Hazmat release
victims seeking redress for their emotional distress would have
to resort to the traditional tort theories of negligence and strict
liability.
Each member of the community must then establish the
elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. Each
member must demonstrate that the disruption, discomfort, and
emotional distress suffered by each of them is compensable.
The crucial issue is whether members of the community may
recover these damages in the absence of any personal or
physical injury.
In the toxic tort context, a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim requires as an element that the claimant be
exposed to the hazmat.27° Without having been exposed to
hazmat, victims do not have a claim. The victim's only recourse
is the theory that his safety has been put at risk by the hazmat
release.27' In a toxic tort context, the concern for public health
and safety are the immediate concerns of a hazmat release.
These concerns arise from the possibility of exposure to the
hazmat. The pathways of exposure include inhalation, skin, or
eye contact with contaminated air, water, or soil, or ingestion of
nutrients exposed to such contamination.2 72

The issue that

inevitably arises is whether any type of recovery is available to
those victims whose detriment consists only in the disruption of
their daily activities.
Hazmat release victims may not have standing to bring a
public nuisance action if the consequences of the hazmat
release are widespread.2

73

No public health or welfare interest

268. See Lee v. Bank of Am., 267 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
269. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 989 (1993); BAJI,
supra note 43, No. 12.80.
270. See Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 989.
271. See Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
272. See JANETTE D. SHERMAN, CHEMICAL EXPOSURE AND DISEASE 58-60
(1994); STEPHEN HALL ET AL., CHEMICAL EXPOSURE AND Toxic RESPONSES 11
(1997).
273. See Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971).
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is served by a limitation imposed by the special injury
requirement. Instead, it merely relieves a tortfeasor of the
consequences of its conduct where the injured happened to be
an entire community or numerous individuals. The greater the
catastrophe, the greater immunity the tortfeasor may obtain.
This is not a logical interpretation or application of the law or
any societal goal, nor is it sound public policy.27 4 Under the
statutory definition of nuisance, a public nuisance is
distinguished from a private nuisance where an "entire
community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons" are affected.275 Unfortunately for all concerned, the
semantics of "community," "neighborhood," or "number" can be
amorphous at best. For example, where all of the citizens of
Santa Clara County were alleged to have been subjected to a
public nuisance (air pollution), four individual plaintiffs were
unable to plead special injury beyond the public nuisance, so as
to constitute a private nuisance.276 It is hard to imagine any
public nuisance more detrimental to the public health and
safety than the spreading of a toxic risk.
In any event, it is hard to comprehend any public policy
that would exonerate a tortfeasor, or even a criminal
wrongdoer,277 while leaving a victim without judicial recourse.
Where a toxic nuisance injuriously affects the public, every

274. One author has noted that nuisance law has been historically structured to
favor the economic interests of industries while environmental concerns, property,
and health interests of the public were relegated:
Especially in the nineteenth century, economic, rather than ecological,
considerations shaped the application of nuisance law in cases
concerned with the environment. Several legal scholars have argued
that during the era of industrialization, economic development took
precedence over environmental concerns in the courts ...

[Elven prior

to the Civil War, American courts reshaped the distinction between
public and private nuisances "into a major barrier against individual
interferences with the process of internal improvements." The only
means available to reach a public nuisance was through an indictment
brought by public authorities. The public nuisance doctrine could be
used to defeat a private damage remedy. "The most significant fact
about the public nuisance doctrine," Horwitz concluded, "was that it
enabled courts to extend to private companies virtually the same
immunity from lawsuits that the state received under the theory of
consequential damages."
Martin V. Melosi, Hazardous Waste and Environmental Liability: An Historical
Perspective, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 741, 763-64 (1988) (emphasis added).
275. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3480-3481 (West 1999).
276. See Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350.
277. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.8 (West 1999).
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affected member should be able to pursue the full panoply of
to tort victims, no matter how great the
tort remedies available
2 78
number of victims.
V.

SEVERE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENTS

A.

With Reference to Economic Detriment

A natural and probable consequence of the harm caused by
the release of hazmat into the environment is the disruption of
the activities of everyone affected. Apart from the personal
discomfort or mental suffering inflicted, a hazmat incident
frequently interrupts all manner of personal and economic
pursuits. Clearly, a sudden, isolated hazmat episode such as a
toxic cloud, a ruptured tank car or pipeline, the discovery of
explosives, virus, bacteria, escaping radiation, and similar
events will interdict free mobility and cause economic loss. In
some situations, there may be a duty on the part of victims to
cease their activities and to take steps to prevent or minimize
injury to themselves.2 79 Others simply are prevented from
In these cases, the
continuing with their activities. 8 °
disruption and economic loss are directly attributable to the
release and should be recognized legally as detriment for which
the victim should be compensated.2 81
Loss or damage that a victim may recover are economic
damages, which means that they are objectively verifiable
monetary losses.282 They may include, past and future medical
expenses including diagnostic28 3 and monitoring costs,"' loss of
278. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281, 3333; cf. Tuohey, supra note 202, at 5.
279. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1998) ("Every one is responsible... for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care... except so far as the
latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.")
(Emphasis added). However, in the midst of a catastrophe, it is difficult to
determine whether one should zig or zag, to say the least. See BAJI, supra note 43,
Nos. 4.40-4.41.
280. For example, in Mcgee v. Shell Oil Co., residents, evacuated as a result of a
release of sulfuric acid which vaporized into the atmosphere, and claimed damages
for inconvenience as well as for personal injuries. 659 So. 2d 812, 813 (La. App.
5th. Cir. 1995).
281. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1997).
282. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 2000); 2 COMM. ON
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 14.76.

283. Medical costs for diagnostic evaluation of injury are recoverable. But for
his exposure to hazmat, a plaintiff would not have been obliged to seek and obtain
medical diagnoses (as distinguished from treatment), in order to determine the
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285 or use of property,"'
past
loss of property
287 diminution
costs and
of future
repairearnings,
or replacement,
in value of

nature and extent of his injuries, if any. This right of recovery was affirmed in
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1005 (1993), reaffirming the
rule enunciated in Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 656 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993), that expenditures for medical testing and evaluation which would be
unnecessary, if the plaintiff had not been wrongfully exposed to pollutants, are a
correlative detriment within section 3333 of the California Civil Code.
284. Future medical monitoring costs are recoverable. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at
1004-09; Miranda, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 658-60; 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 14.10.1 (1999). The need for medical monitoring
is determined on an individual basis, based upon the individual's history and
circumstances. Therefore, in a mass tort action, certification of a medical
monitoring class is improper. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court, 94
Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that "medical monitoring" class for
thousands claiming exposure from contaminated groundwater is improper; there is
no sufficient community of interest based upon the numerous individual issues and
proof relating to each individual's need for and entitlement to monitoring), review
granted, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 430 (Cal. 2000); see also Gutierrez v. Cassiar Mining Co.,
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 135-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the court must
consider pre-existing condition to determine the extent of medical monitoring (new
or different) that became necessary as a result of defendant's conduct).
285. See, eg., Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal. 3d 285 (1977) (granting
damages for plaintiffs forfeiture of a Cal-Vet loan for being "forced to move" from
his home due to the nuisance created by a nearby sewage treatment plant).
286. See, eg., More v. San Bernardino, 118 Cal. App. 732 (1931).
Contamination of water supply and other injuries to real property caused by
sewage flowing onto plaintiffs property are objectively verifiable monetary losses.
Likewise, contamination of groundwater is a public nuisance; a private landowner's
inability to sell property as a consequence (because the contamination spread
under the owner's property), as well as the costs incurred by the landowner to
investigate the contamination, give rise to a claim for a private nuisance in favor of
the landowner. See Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr.
2d 377 (1993). By statute, a real property owner may be compelled to record a
notice of the presence of hazardous substances in the property. Such property
includes: (1) land where a significant disposal of hazardous waste has occurred
resulting in a significant existing or potential hazard to public health or safety
("hazardous waste property") and (2) land within 2,000 feet of hazardous waste
property ("border zone property"). See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25117.325117.4 (West 1992); see also id. §§ 25229-25230 (West 1999); 9 MILLER & STARR,
supra note 90, § 29.53. Because of the depressing effect such declaration and notice
may have on the value of the property, the legislature requires the assessor to
reassess such land subject to the restriction. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25240 (West 1999); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 402.3 (West 1990). Aside from the
hazardous wasteland use restriction, section 402.1 of the 1990 California Revenue
and Taxation Code also requires the assessor to consider the effect of other
environmental constraints to the use of land on the value of land. Cf. CAL. CiV.
PROC. CODE § 726.5 (West Supp. 2000).
287. For an injury to real property, the proper measure of damages is the lesser
of diminution in value of the property or costs of repair, "the lesser rule." See
Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, 136 Cal. Rptr. 751, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); see also
Shaffer v. Debbas, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that since
costs of repair were $130,000 and diminution in value because of damage was
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$585,000; the proper award was costs of repair); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726.5
(West Supp. 2000).
288. See, eg., Varjabedian, 20 Cal. 3d at 293-95 (holding that diminution in
value of the home was caused by the fumes and odors from the sewage plant). Note
that loss of value damages may be recovered in a nuisance action only if the
nuisance "permanently" damaged the property. If the nuisance is abatable, loss of
value damages cannot be awarded. See Alexander v. McKnight, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453
(1992). See generally 9 MILLER & STARR, supra note 90, § 29.14. Aside from the
negative impact from environmental constraints on land use imposed by
administrative agencies, disclosure requirements imposed by statutes such as
sections 1102 et seq. of the California Civil Code (requiring disclosure upon the sale
of residential property), inflict a burden on anyone wishing to dispose of
contaminated property, the market value or desirability of which has been affected.
See generally Tracy, supra note 37. See also Alex Geisinger, Nothing but Fear
Itself A Social-PsychologicalModel of Stigma Harm and Its Legal Implications, 76
NEB. L. REv. 452, 454 (1997) ("[T]he harm from stigma is to reputation and not to
property."); see, eg., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Cooper v.
Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Alexander, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
456.
289. Hazmat contamination and cleanup costs support a reduction in the
property's valuation/assessment. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. County
of Monterey, 272 Cal. Rptr. 745, 750-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ((requiring assessor to
consider pollution cleanup costs which reduce fair market value of property;
however, there was insufficient evidence that assessor was aware of the pollution
when valuation was made) ("A property is assessed at the price at which a willing
buyer and a willing seller would consummate an open market sale of the property
considering the polluted condition of the property.")). Mola Dev. Corp. v. Orange
County Assessment Appeals Bd., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 547-48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding market value of contaminated property is properly assessed by deducting
cost of cleanup). A victim's lender may also accede to rights detrimental to the
victim. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726.5 (West Supp. 2000).
290. A private party in a nuisance case may recover the reasonable cost of his
own efforts to abate a nuisance or to prevent future injury. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 233, § 89, at 640. These include expenses incurred for sampling,
testing, and monitoring their tap and other water supply costs of bottled water, and
other substitute sources for subsistence, relocation costs, temporary shelter, etc.
See, eg., Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377
(1993) (holding costs incurred by private landowner to investigate groundwater
contamination gives rise to a claim for private nuisance). Public agencies may
recover emergency response costs. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 13009.6
(West 2000); see also id. §§ 25500 et seq., 25514.5-25514.6, 25531 et seq., 25540
(West 1999); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3484 (West 1997); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 731
(West 1980). In the absence of such statutes, the general nuisance laws (CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 3479 et seq. (West 1997)), which allow abatement as a remedy for a public
nuisance, do not authorize recovery by a public entity of expenses incurred in
abating a nuisance, such as fire suppression costs. See City of Los Angeles v.
Shpegel-Dimsey, Inc., 244 Cal. Rptr. 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that in the
absence of a statute or ordinance authorizing recovery, city could not recover
substantial expenses in putting out a fire) (citing County of San Luis Obispo v.
Abalone Alliance, 233 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (unless provided by
statute or ordinance, the cost of public services for protection is to be borne by the
public as a whole)) (decided before enactment of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
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of business

Also categorized as

economic damages are loss of economic or education potential,
loss of productivity, absenteeism, support expenses, accidents
or injury, and other pecuniary loss (caused by the use of an
illegal controlled substance).2 94
A caveat with regard to a nuisance action is that the
business interference and the resulting pecuniary loss must be
particular to the plaintiff or to a limited group that includes the
plaintiff. When it becomes general and widespread as to affect
a whole community or a wide area within it, there is no distinct
kind of damage suffered, and a public nuisance action cannot be
maintained to recover the losses.299
A person who reasonably attempts to minimize his
damages can recover the expenses incurred, and often those
damages result from a reasonable effort to prevent or minimize

13009.6).
291. See, eg., George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979) (finding company entitled to damages for the wages it paid to employees who
were idle for two hours as a result of a power failure at the company's plant).
Compensation for a person's time spent in cleaning up debris from falling leaves
from branches of a tree overhanging the person's premises is special damage
attributable to a nuisance. See Bonde v. Bishop, 112 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1952).
292. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Wolleunann, 390 N.E.2d 669
(Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (concerning a class action for damages brought by two
operators of an inn on behalf of several thousand individuals evacuated from their
homes and businesses because of the threat of explosion and fire from an
overturned propane gas tanker); Harbor Beach Surf Club v. Water Taxi, 711 So. 2d
1230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding the erection of a footbridge too low over a
lake, which prevented taxi company from servicing a hotel and apartments, was a
public nuisance and the taxi company suffered lost business opportunities and lost
profits).
293. See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal. 2d 104 (1945) (holding that
recovery is allowed for loss of profits when business is interfered with by a
nuisance); see also Hutcherson v. Alexander, 70 Cal. Rptr. 366, 372-73 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1968) (declaring a fence a nuisance as it was erected to hide plaintiffs
business premises from view of highway travelers); Christopher v. Jones, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964) (entitling an orchard owner to an injunction against
chemical repackaging plant in an industrial-zoned area releasing chlorine gas that
harmed fruit trees); Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 382 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1951) (concerning cattle raising business that lost use of grazing land
covered by dust and debris from adjacent cement manufacturing plant). However,
economic losses cannot be recovered on a strict liability theory. See Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15 (1965) (concerning product liability).
294. Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11705(d)(1).

295. See Prosser, supra note 239, at 1015. Unfortunately, geography is blurry in
this context and no bright line test exists.
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damages.296 Section 3333 of the California Civil Code provides
that, for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
the measure of damages is the amount which will compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not. 97
There is judicial recognition that severe economic damage,
298 In Crisci v.
may justify emotional distress damages.
se,
per
Security Insurance Co., the court noted: "[D]amages for mental
distress have also been awarded in cases where the tortious
without any
conduct was an interference with property rights
9
distress." 29
mental
from
apart
injuries
personal
This passage seems to establish a right to recover damages
for emotional distress in cases dealing solely with property
damage. Further, The California Book of Approved Jury
Instructions, Number 12.85, which cites both Crisci and
Jarchow as authority, provides: "A plaintiff who has suffered a
substantial financial injury which was caused by a defendant's
intentional or reckless wrongful conduct, is entitled to recover
damages from that defendant for any mental or emotional
00
distress resulting from such financial injury."
Cooper, on the other hand, found no California case
allowing recovery for emotional distress arising out of negligent
injury to property. The Cooper court enunciated the rule that
recovery for emotional distress arising out of loss of property is
limited to cases in which, at a minimum, a duty of care exists
by virtue of a preexisting relationship between the parties or in
3
which the damage arises out of an intentional tort. '
In contrast, the Potter court expressly held that the duty
may be imposed by law, as well as assumed by the defendant,
and even then the "breach of the duty must threaten physical
3 2
injury, not simply damage to property or financial interests."
296. See O'REILLY, supra note 151, § 23.03. See, eg., Jarchow v. Transamerica

Title Ins. Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (awarding attorney fees
incurred to quiet title and in addition, supported damages for emotional distress
based upon negligent conduct).
297. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 2000).
298. See id.; 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, §
12.85; see also C.G. Tuohey, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Arising
From Breach of Contract: Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance Company, 8

Sw. U. L. REV. 655, 655-71 (1976).
299. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433(1967).
300. BAJI,supra note 43, No. 12.85.

301. See Cooper v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
302. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 985 (1993) (citing
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In Jarchow, where the defendant assumed the duty, the
court required "substantial damage" apart from the emotional
injury in order to allow emotional distress damages on a
negligence theory."'3 The court noted, however, that the
substantial damages
need not be "compensable." 4
"[Interference with one's legally protected interests is sufficient
3
damage.""
Yet, the Jarchow court found support for the
emotional distress damages based on the "substantial damages"
of attorney fees and loss of use damages awarded to the
plaintiffs. Interestingly, the Jarchow court expressly stated
that it was not setting forth a rule that would permit recovery
for negligently inflicted emotional distress where mental injury
was the only damage caused by the tortious conduct, leaving
that question for the California Supreme Court. 30 6

The

"damage" required to support an emotional distress claim need
not be compensable under Jarchow seems to be saying that a
claimant did not suffer any legal detriment other than
emotional distress.0 7 Jarchow may provide an exception to the
physical impact or injury rule. This case and others allow
recovery of emotional distress damages in an action based on
negligence, but typically involve a preexisting relationship
between the parties or otherwise involve intentional tortious
conduct.
Cooper v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
303. See Jarchow v. Transamerica, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
304. See id. at 489.
305. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). No California case has allowed recovery
for emotional distress arising solely out of property damage. See Cooper, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (finding that tractor rolling into plaintiffs home causing damage to the
house, grounds, and swimming pool did not entitle plaintiff to emotional distress
damages unless there was a threshold showing of some preexisting relationship or
intentional tort); Lubner v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 30 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (finding that in the absence of a preexisting relationship or intentional
tort, emotional distress damages are not recoverable for destruction of fine art as a
result of a city truck crashing into a home).
306. See Jarchow, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 484 n.11.
307. In Jarchow,the court awarded plaintiffs emotional distress damages based
upon the rationale that plaintiffs suffered substantial damages of a character
which provided sufficient guarantee of genuineness of the claimed emotional
distress. These substantial damages consisted of attorney fees of $7,100 and
damages of $170 for loss of use of property. Significantly, these financial losses or
expenditures were incurred by the plaintiffs voluntarily: (1) attorney fees were
incurred to pursue a quiet title action voluntarily commenced by the plaintiffs; and
(2) plaintiffs voluntarily desisted from pursuing their plan to develop the property
until after the cloud on the title to the property had been eliminated. See id. at
479, 484.
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Without Reference to Economic Detriment
On the emotional distress side, the circumstances of a
hazmat release incident, particularly the sudden airborne
release of toxic chemicals with known injurious effects,"' has
both physical.0 9 and emotional impacts. 10 The fear and horror
of personally being exposed to a cloud of poison gas, or knowing
that family members have been exposed, are absolute
emotional trauma in its purest form.3" Fear also results where
312
the episode is undetected, low level, and long term, as for
example when the long term insidious hazmat contamination of
soil and water, or of indoor pollution by pesticides, fungi, or
other substances, where individuals may learn of personal and
familial hazmat exposure after years, or even decades.313
Under the broad statutory mandate of section 3333 of the
California Civil Code, which allows damages "for all detriment,"
regardless of "whether it could have been anticipated or not,"
California courts have long recognized that where one
wrongfully exposes another to a reasonable possibility of future
disease or disability, resulting emotional distress is a
compensable detriment. For example, an elderly plaintiff
injured in a cable car accident who believed she would be
permanently disabled was denied damages for any future
disability, which was not proven. Nevertheless she was
entitled to damages for her "reasonable apprehension of being
permanently disabled, which apprehension and consequent
mental suffering was a direct and proximate result of her
injury." "
In another case, a patient was overexposed to dental xrays, which gave rise to the possibility that she might develop
cancer at some time in the future. 15 In response to a claim on
B.

308. See Bowler & Schwarzer, supra note 65.
309. See Bowler et al., supra note 35.
310. See Bowler et al., supra note 65.
311. See SEARcY-ALFORD, supra note 97, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND FEAR §

3.12[2], at 3-78.3 to -78.7.
312. Cf. Miller, supra note 179, at 704-05.
313. See, eg., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993)

(concerning residents living adjacent to a landfill into which carcinogens had been
illegally dumped, contaminating the residents' water supply); Cottle v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (building of residential subdivision
on top of a former dump site for oil industry hazardous wastes and by-products).
314. Jones v. United R.R.s of San Francisco, 54 Cal. App. 744, 752-53 (1921).
315. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 982 n.6 (citing Coover v. Painless Parker, Dentist,
105 Cal. App. 110 (1930).
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appeal that the evidence regarding the possibility of cancer was
wholly speculative, the appellate court disagreed, noting that
the patient's present emotional distress was entirely nonconjectural. The court stated, "[tihe necessity of constantly
watching and guarding against cancer, as testified to by the
physician, is an obligation and a burden that the defendant had
3 16
no right to inflict upon the plaintiff.
In a federal case applying California law, an employee
alleged claims for fraudulent concealment, battery, and
emotional distress arising out of exposure to toxic substances at
his workplace. 317 The employee did not allege any presently
diagnosable injury, but alleged two forms of physical injury: (1)
an injury to his immune system rendering him more
susceptible to developing cancer, and (2) an injury through the
increased risk of cancer. The employee also alleged fear and
emotional distress. The court ruled that the allegation that he
suffered fear of contracting serious or lethal diseases as a result
of the toxic exposure stated a present injury sustaining a claim
for relief.
This recognition of the right to recover damages for the
tortious infliction of fear of future disease is important for
several reasons. First, it reflects a broad understanding that,
when caused by the tort of another, such emotional distress is a
legitimate compensable injury, not simply a vicissitude of
modern life that the victim must simply grin and bear. Second,
it means that courts are confident that when all of the other
elements of a tort are present-duty, breach of duty, and
causation-the trier of fact can distinguish the truly injured
plaintiff from the counterfeit. In this context, Potter held,
"'physical injury is not a prerequisite for recovering damages
for serious emotional distress' especially where 'there exists a
guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case.' 318
The distress resulting from a hazmat incident does not
result solely from toxic exposure. If one looks at a community
with one or more facilities in which toxics and hazmat are
stored and handled, one could reasonably foresee that every
316. Coover, 105 Cal. App. at 115. Note that the necessity is also imposed upon
parents whose children have been exposed to hazmat.
317. See Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 673 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal.
1987); cf. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 63-65 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
318. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 986 (citing Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064,
1079 (1992)).
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hazmat incident would impact the community surrounding it.
For example, in hearings before the House Committee on
Natural Resources in connection with the sulfuric acid release
from the General Chemical Corporation Richmond Works in
July 1993, the public health director of Contra Costa County
stated with regard to the repeated hazmat releases and their
adverse impacts on the communities in Richmond:
When we look at the protection of public health, we need
to look at the communities most heavily impacted. Study
after study has demonstrated what is really completely
obvious in the first place, which is that the communities
that are most heavily impacted by hazardous materials
and toxics are predominantly minority communities and
low-income communities, and that these communities
already suffer disproportionately from a whole variety of
public health problems.
If we look at Richmond, California, here, where this
event occurred, we see we not only have a heavy
concentration of toxics and hazardous materials, but this
community is already disproportionately impacted by
every public health problem from AIDS to unemployment.
We need to look at the health impacts of this sort of
release in a broader context than just a single isolated
release of a sulfuric acid cloud in the community,
important as that is.
Scientifically accurate as these medical bulletins may be
and we need consultation from CAL EPA, OES, and people
in this audience-but when Dr. Brunner's medical
bulletins say, there will be no long-term health impacts, so
don't worry be happy, this needs to be put in context. In
this event, the fact is that thousands of people were injured,
even if only temporarily, and thousands of other people
were so frightened and so concerned, legitimately, that they
needed to come for medical attention for evaluation of
themselves and their children and reassurance, and that

15 people were hospitalized, even though the majority of
those already had underlying disease.
We also need to remember this is not an isolated
occurrence. This has happened again and again and
repeatedly over the last few years in this community and
throughout Contra Costa County, and we issue the same
bulletin on the no long-term health impacts. Everyone in
the community knows what everyone in the health
department knows-that this could have been much worse
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and that the potential threat for these kinds of releases
exceeds what we have seen already. People in the
community already have enough problems and enough
concerns and enough health impacts, and they don't need
to worry about whether their children are going to be
gassed in their homes and whether the health impact
exceeds just the respiratory irritation.
Impact also includes the outrage, the invasiveness of
having toxic stuff spread over your homes and your
children's toys-what Henry Clark refers to as toxic
trespass-this also needs to be figured into the health
impacts. 19
When people of a community are forced to remain indoors
or forced to evacuate and leave their homes, schools, or
workplaces, it cannot be denied that such people are
emotionally and economically adversely impacted."' Yet, the
law has always been skeptical of emotional distress damage
claims, primarily because of the difficulty of ascertaining that
they are genuine.3 2' This is particularly true in mass toxic tort
situations." However, given the astronomic costs of toxic tort
litigation, with expensive discovery and experts, it is suggested
that such costs alone are sufficient to deter claims for emotional
distress.
In negligence cases, the traditional requirement for
recovery of emotional distress damage has been physical injury
or physical impact. The Second Restatement of Torts states
that a negligent actor is not liable for conduct that results in
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other
compensable damage.2 3 This is the law because first, emotional
disturbance that is not serious enough to have physical
consequences is trivial and thus, non-compensable.2 4 Second,
319. See The Community and Toxics, Accidents Involving Hazardous
Materials, Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong. 100-02,
1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Wendel Brunner, Director, Public Health
Services, Contra Costa County Health Services Department) (emphases added).
See also Report on Hazardous Materials, supra note 28.
320. See, e.g., Bright v. East Side Mosquito Abatement Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 7
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959); People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997).
321. See, eg., Tuohey, supra note 298.
322. See generally Miller, supra note 312, at 692-94; Gregory C. Sarno, Infliction
ofEmotional Distress:Toxic Exposure, 6 A.L.R. 5th 162 (1992).
323. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1984).
324. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3533 (West 1984) (the law disregards trifles). But see
Jarchow v. Transamerica, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
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emotional disturbance is subjective and easily feigned, and
bodily harm which results from it provides a guarantee of
genuineness of the claim. Finally, when a defendant is merely
negligent, the fault is not great enough to make a purely
mental disturbance compensable.3 26
California allows emotional distress damages when
accompanied by a physical impact or a manifestation of
physical injury. Courts are quick to explain, however, that
physical injury or physical impact is not a prerequisite to the
recovery of emotional distress damages.326 In certain cases of
negligence, courts have allowed recovery in the absence of
physical impact or physical injury in many situations. First,
where the negligence results in toxic exposure and produces a
fear of cancer or future disease which is more likely than not to
occur because of the exposure.327 Second, where the negligence
is of a type that will cause highly unusual and predictable
emotional distress.328 Third, where the negligence arises in a
situation involving breach of fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duties,
as in a bad faith refusal to pay insurance proceeds.329 Fourth,
where recovery is based upon witnessing an injury to a close
relative (the "bystander" principle).3 ° Fifth, where "reckless"
injury. 31
wrongful conduct has caused substantial financial
Furthermore, in many torts such as assault, battery, false
imprisonment, and defamation, mental suffering will
frequently constitute the principal element of damages.332
Emotional distress without physical injury which results
from "traditional" torts versus "toxic" torts characterized by a
long latency period can be distinguished by the seriousness of
the risk of harm, the inability to eliminate the risk following

325. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b.
326. See, eg., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 986 (1993).
327. See id. See generally PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, MASS TORT LITIGATION (1996).
328. See Allen v. Jones, 163 Cal. Rptr. 445, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(mishandling of cremated remains of brother); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27
Cal. 3d 916, 930 (1980) (explaining the negligent advice given to a patient with
syphilis resulting in severe distress to her husband); see also, Miller, supra note
312, at 692-94, 697-99.
329. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425 (1967); see also Gruenberg v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566 (1973).
330. See Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (1989); see also Dillon v. Legg, 68
Cal. 2d 728 (1968).
331. See BAJI, supra note 43, No. 12.85; cf Tuohey, supra note 298.
332. See, e., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 338 (1952)
(concerning intentional infliction of emotional distress).
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exposure, and the duration of risk, which may be lifelong.333
The duration of the risk and the injured party's helplessness to
remove the risk provide the most compelling arguments for a
change in traditional emotional distress jurisprudence.
Traditional common law did not and could not contemplate that
long after a negligent actor ceased the negligent activity the
plaintiff would suffer from the fear of eventually being harmed
by the activity. Likewise, the traditional common law could not
foresee the reality that a plaintiff could remove herself from the
negligent activity and yet still be at risk because of it.334
Thus, one exposed to hazmat which does not immediately
manifest personal injury, physical or emotional, is confronted
with a series of difficult issues. First, is whether one should
pursue a class action within the statute of limitations, thereby
tolling the statute for other potential members of the class,
while making sure that one individually files in a timely
manner. 5 Unfortunately, because of the idiosyncratic nature
of an individual's exposure to hazmat,33 6 class certification may
not be available.3 Second is the filing of an independent direct
333. See Miller, supra note 312, at 688-89.
334. See id.
335. See Bangert v. Narmco Materials, 209 Cal. Rptr. 438, 439 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) (concerning putative class seeking damages for chemical air and water
pollution) (citing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974)
(explaining class action tolled statute for all putative class members who moved to
intervene after certification denied for lack of numerosity)).
We neither overlook nor underestimate the dilemma posed to a toxictort plaintiff by the single cause of action principle. The time between
exposure to toxins and the onset of disease may, and likely will, be
long. The plaintiff who secures an award for immediate physical
injury, monitoring costs, or some other proper item of damage, might
be foreclosed from recovering damages in a second suit filed when the
disease actually develops, years, perhaps decades, after the exposure,
on the ground a cause of action cannot be "split." The problem is
magnified if the plaintiff is unable to recover, in the first action,
damages for the increased risk of disease. In addition, statute of
limitations rules may prevent the plaintiff from waiting until the
disease develops before bringing an action.
Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(citations omitted).
336. See, eg., Anderson v. Southern Pac. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 743, 753 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1964) ("It is common knowledge that some people are allergic to many
substances which have no detrimental effect upon the great majority."); cf.
ASHFORD & MILLER, supra note 63.
337. See Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103 (1988); see also Fuhrman v.
California Satellite Sys., 225 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See Boston, supra
note 42, at 198-99. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343 (1995).

2001]

HAZMAT AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

727

other "mass accident" victims, might be
action that, with
8
"congregated."

Class certification and congregation of toxic
tort actions are more feasible, if at all, where product liability,
as opposed to hazmat releases into the air, water, or soil, are
involved." 9 Third is the invocation of the "delayed discovery
rule," where California courts toll the running of the statute of
limitations during the latency period until appropriate
symptomology manifests itself.4 ° Of course, this is a risky
election because a court arriving at its own belated
determination of the time lapse after sufficient injury
manifestation might conclude that the statute had already run.
Media publicity may also trigger the running of the statute.3"
338. See Boston, supra note 42, at 198-200; cf Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation
and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PENN. L. REV. 1943 (2000).
339. In California, there is an elaborate statutory procedural mechanism for
product liability litigation which facilitates class action (Consumer Legal Remedies
Act, CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1750 et seq. (West 1994)), whereas there is nothing
comparable for non-consumer toxic exposures. As for the latter, courts are obliged
to fashion their own solutions under their general discretionary powers under
sections 128, 382, and 404 et seq. of the 1994 California Civil Procedure Code, as
well as rules 1500 et seq. of the 1991 California Rules of Court, creating a fertile
field for inconsistency.
340. The issue is delineating between when a cause of action accrues and
between the statute of limitations period begins to run. As a rule, when injury or
damage is the last element of a tortious cause of action to occur, the cause of action
accrues once any actual and appreciable harm has occurred. There must be
appreciable harm before the damage element of a cause of action accrues,
triggering the commencement of the limitations period. See San Francisco Unified
Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1318, 1331, 1335 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995). Under the discovery rule, for statute of limitations purposes, a cause of
action for a latent injury does not accrue until plaintiff discovers or reasonably
should have discovered that he has suffered a compensable injury. The policy
reason behind the discovery rule is to ameliorate the harsh rule that would allow
the limitations period for filing suit to expire before a plaintiff has or should have
learned of the latent injury and its cause. See Buttram v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 16 Cal. 4th 520, 530-31 (1997).
341. See McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); see also Polensky v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
It is unclear whether the facts that particular newspapers published
articles on particular subjects on particular dates are either "of such
common knowledge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that
they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute" (Evid. Code, § 452,
subd. (g)) or "are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of
immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of
reasonably indisputable accuracy" (id., subd. (h)). (Compare People v.
Massie (1998) 19 Cal. 4th 550, 566, fn. 4 [refusing to take judicial notice
of newspaper articles]; and People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 1133,
1167 [affirming refusal to take judicial notice]; with Nogart v.Upjohn
Co. (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 383, 408 [taking judicial notice that a
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Typically, media coverage may publicize the detection of
hazmat some distance from one's home or business, rendering
it difficult, if not impossible, for a private citizen to conduct an
independent investigation on someone else's property, even if
that private citizen could afford to underwrite such a cost.
Even an independent investigation of soil or water on one's own
property may be cost prohibitive.
Therefore, in the
overwhelming majority of soil and water contamination cases,
private citizens are generally reduced to wait for the cognizant
lead governmental investigative agency to conduct its
investigation and publicly release its findings, which can and
frequently does take years.
In a case involving claims for property damage, however, a
court held that when a statewide agency orders an
investigation of groundwater and soil because of the discovery
of contamination on plaintiffs property, a plaintiff is deemed to
have been put on notice of serious contamination problems,
which reasonable diligence would have discovered the full
extent of the problems. Plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit
of the discovery rule, and the statute of limitations (for injury to
real property) commenced to run from the date of the state
order. 4 '
Alternatively, rather than risk a later determination that
the statute was triggered by publicity, one could file
immediately upon learning of the contamination detection.
This may defer trial until there is a definitive determination
that would quantify and qualify the hazmat as to that person.
Here, however, the mandatory five-year statute within which
the action must be brought to trial 4 might well run before such
a definitive determination is made, causing a dismissal of the
"controversy" had arisen in the popular press, without specifying the
media involved], People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 86, 174, fn. 24
[taking judicial notice of newspaper articles], and People v. Jurado
(1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 470, 482 [same].).
[Elven were we to take judicial notice of the newspaper articles, there
is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs read or even received any of
those newspapers.
McGill v. M. J. Brock & Sons, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 142 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
342. See CAMSI IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1525, 1536-38 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991). In denying rehearing, the court noted that plaintiff failed to plead
a continuing nuisance or trespass claim and refused to amend to so plead, so as to
avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. See id. at 1541.
343. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 1998).
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prematurely filed action.
Rather than reduce the running of the statute of limitation
in toxic cases to a game, the fairer solution is to trigger its
running from the release of the final governmental
investigative report. Certainly, such an agonizing waiting
experience constitutes emotional distress that unevenly
impacts any population, and may range from "severe" to
"nominal," according to proof.
However, the Delayed or Belated Discovery Rule has
proven to be somewhat effective, even where different toxic
injuries manifest themselves, one after another, in asbestos
cases."' In any event, a toxic victim should not be expected to
make a self-diagnosis of a progressive disease, because even
when the toxic injury becomes apparent it may be totally
impossible to determine when it was inflicted.84
1. Per Se, Without Physical Injury or Impact
In the seminal case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, the California Supreme Court recognized that
"interest in freedom from negligent infliction of emotional
distress is entitled to independent legal protection"346 and held
that a husband whose wife was negligently misdiagnosed as
having syphilis was entitled to damages for the emotional
distress he suffered upon learning of the erroneous diagnosis. 47
The court declared that "there is a duty to refrain from
negligent infliction of emotional distress," 48 and allowed the
husband to recover emotional distress without showing
contemporaneous physical impact or injury. In the absence of
physical injury, the tort is not negligent infliction of emotional
distress, but simply negligence, with its usual elements. 49 The
344. But see Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship Management Corp., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d
533 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), reh'g denied; Richmond v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 78 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 356 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Contra Mitchell v. Asbestos Corp., 73 Cal. Rptr.
2d 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). See also Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing Martinez-Ferrer v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 164 Cal. Rptr. 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that action not barred
for later-developing injuries was qualitatively different and unrelated to original
harm)).
345. See Polensky v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(berylliosis).
346. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 928 (1980).
347. See id. at 924-31.
348. Id. at 928.
349. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th 965, 985 (1993); see also Miller, supra note 312, at
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development of the law permitting emotional distress without
injury or impact dealt primarily with the sole recovery of
emotional distress, such as for fear of one's own safety (the
"direct victim" rule) 5 ° and fear for the safety of another
("bystander" rule). 5 1 Whether a toxic tort plaintiff can recover
emotional distress damages alone is presently dependent upon
traditional tort analysis.352
The term, "direct victim, " 313 is a misnomer as it literally
describes all plaintiffs who have been injured by a breach of a
duty owed to them. The right to recover emotional distress
damages as a "direct victim" arises from a breach of duty that is
assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a
matter of law, or from defendant's preexisting relationship with
14
the plaintiff."
Some non-bystander cases narrowly define a
"direct victim" as one who has a preexisting relationship with
the defendant.355 If a "preexisting relationship" is essential, no
member of any community adjacent to a hazmat facility will
ever be deemed a "direct victim," even if all the elements of
negligence otherwise exist.356
This "direct victim" concept was disapproved of in Wooden
35 7
v. Raveling,
a case involving negligent infliction of emotional

704-05 (analyzing Molien).
350. See, eg., Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182 (1931); see also
Molien, 27 Cal. 3d 916.
351. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968); see also Thing v. La Chusa, 48
Cal. 3d 644 (1989).
352. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 985; see also Klein v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
353. The term originated in Molien, which reasoned that because the
physician's negligence was directed at the wife and the husband, the husband was
a "direct victim." Molien, 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23; see also Klein, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
36-37.
354. See Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores Cal., 6 Cal. 4th 124, 129-30 (1993);
Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1073 (1992).
355. See, eg., Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Bro v. Glaser, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); cf.
BAJI, supra note 43, No. 12.83.
In Krupnick, the court stated, "[Olne must have had a preexisting
relationship with the defendant in order to have a protected interest in being
free from unintentionally caused emotional distress." Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. at
45.
356. See Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (portending that much concluding, based
upon the absence of a preexisting relationship between the parties, that "[als a
consequence, plaintiffs could never be or become direct victims of defendant's
unintentional behavior.") (emphasis added).
357. 71 Cal. Rptr 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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distress absent impact, physical injury, or bystanders. 58 The
court applied the analysis in direct victim cases under
traditional principles of negligence." 9 However, the court
rejected the concept that a "direct victim" case is based
exclusively on a preexisting relationship between the parties
and held that there are three sources of duty supporting a
direct victim case: (1) a duty assumed by the defendant, (2) a
duty imposed on the defendant by law, and (3) a duty arising
out of a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the
The Wooden court alluded to the Potter decision,
defendant.'
noting that in Potter, the defendant had violated a duty
imposed by law not to dispose of toxic contaminants in a
landfill. It concluded that the breach of that duty supported a
claim for emotional distress. 6 '
358. Before the Krupnick decision was rendered, the California Supreme Court
had debunked the special relationship "direct victim" theory in Potter that
"[c]ontrary to amici curiae'ssuggestions, this principle (emotional distress without
physical injury or impact in a negligence action) has never been restricted to cases
involving bystanders or preexisting relationships. Notably, amici curiae cite no
authority even suggesting such a limitation." Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 986 (1993) (emphasis added).
359. In upholding the woman's right to recover emotional distress damages for
her fear of her safety, the Wooden court ruled by quoting Justice George's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Potter:
Well over half a century ago, this court recognized a plaintiffs right to
recover damages for fright, shock, and nervous distress when the
negligent conduct of a defendant places the plaintiff personally at risk,
causing the plaintiff reasonably to fear for his or her own safety, even
in the absence of any injurious impact. [Citation]. Thus, for example, if
an automobile driver negligently speeds by a pedestrian in a crosswalk,
narrowly missing the pedestrian but causing him or her reasonably to
suffer serious emotional distress as a result of the encounter, the
pedestrian is entitled to recover damages for reasonable emotional
distress, even though the driver's conduct, while posing a risk of
personal harm to the pedestrian, did not in fact inflict any direct
physical injury.... [S]o long as the defendant has breached a duty of
care owed to the plaintiff, thereby subjecting the plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of personal injury or illness, and the defendant's
conduct is of such a nature that a reasonable person, in the plaintiffs
position, would sustain serious emotional distress as a result of such
conduct, the plaintiff who in fact sustains such emotional distress
generally is entitled to recover damages for that distress.
Wooden, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897-98 (quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1021 (George, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
360. See also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, 973 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir.
1992) (arguing that individuals on the ground fearing for their own safety are
direct victims).
361. See Wooden, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896; see also, Pintor v. Ong, 259 Cal. Rptr.
577, 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (violating a statutory duty is a tort which entitles
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In light of Wooden, California clearly recognizes a direct
victim cause of action for fear of safety directly resulting from a
negligent act causing the threatened impact of an automobile.
By the same token, persons in the path of a hazmat release who
fear for their safety also should be entitled to damages for their
fear and anguish. The potential effects of an exposure to toxin
and other hazmat are no less lethal than the impact of an
automobile.36
Another "category" of negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims has been referred to as toxic "exposure" claims,
typified by the Potter case. 4 In Potter, the California Supreme
Court stressed that recovery of damages for emotional distress
does not require physical injury or impact,"' and the principle
of recovery is not restricted to bystander or preexisting
relationships. The Potter court stated that, "precedent in the
law of nuisance and trespass establishes quite clearly that
emotional distress without physical injury is compensable."
However, a defendant's liability for negligently causing mental
distress is limited by the requirement that the distress be
serious. 7 Furthermore, there must either be proof of mental
distress "of a medically significant nature" or of "some
'
guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case."368
Toxic exposure by itself is required, but exposure by itself is not

plaintiff to all detriment caused by breach of the duty, including damages for
emotional distress).
362. See Wooden, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891; Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal. App. 2d 581
(Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
363. See, eg., Merry v. Westinghouse Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 852 (M.D. Pa.
1988) and cases cited therein (physical impact could be inferred from the fact
plaintiffs inhaled, ingested, and absorbed hazmat in contaminated wells).
364. See Klein v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 36-37 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
365. Note again that the Potter court held that ingestion of carcinogenic
substances will not, per se, support a claim for fear of cancer. See Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 971-72. Accord Metro-North
Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (arguing that in a toxic tort
context, exposure to a carcinogenic substance is not physical impact adequate to
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act).
366. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 986 n.10; see also 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 12.88.
367. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 989 n.12.
368. Id. at 987-88 (quoting Molien v. Kaiser, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930 (1980) (citing
Rodriguez v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970))). See also Miller, supra note 312, at
697 n.114.
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enough to establish the reasonableness of the fear of cancer."'
The Potter court went on to hold that fear of cancer is
compensable without a showing of symptoms, as long as
plaintiff shows that the fear stems from reliable medical and
scientific evidence that it is more likely than not that cancer
will develop in the future from exposure to the toxic
substances.
The Wooden case is similar to cases in which plaintiffs
were denied recovery for emotional distress suffered as a result
of the loss of property. The Potter court noted that, although
recovery is available for emotional distress arising out of
defendant's breach of duty, "[elven then, with rare exception, a
breach of the duty must threaten physical injury, not simply
damage to property or financial condition."'" In Gonzales v.
Personal Storage, Inc.,37 a storage facility tenant was denied
emotional distress for the negligent handling of her property,
but was allowed to recover those damages for emotional
distress resulting from the conversion of her property. In
Erlich v. Menezes,"7' a negligent breach of contract to build a
house resulted only in economic injury. The court held that the
homeowner was not entitled to emotional distress damages. In
sharp contrast, where a tenant sued a landlord for negligent
failure to repair defective premises, the court held that
"negligent infliction of emotional distress-anxiety discomfort is
compensable without physical injury in cases involving tortious
interference with property rights."74 The court emphasized that
tenancy interests are a protected property right. 7 5

369. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 989; cf. BAJI, supra note 43, Nos. 12.80.1 to 12.80.2
(1995 revision).
370. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 989; see also 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, § 12.80.1 (1995) (Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress Fear of Cancer/AIDS). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.C.2. Toxic
insult and its potential injury is idiosyncratic and each person in a mass toxic
exposure will be impacted differently, rendering such a burden of proof virtually
impossible for a victim to meet. See generally Boston, supra note 42, at 195-231.
371. Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 985.
372. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 473 (1997).
373. 21 Cal. 4th 543 (1999).
374. Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)
(emphasis added).
375. See id.
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2. Discomfort and Annoyance Arising from
Nuisance/ Trespass
Discomfort and annoyance, as distinguished from fear or
anxiety, are recognized elements of damage proximately caused
by a nuisance.376 For example, residents forced to leave their
home following a blowout of an oil well, which resulted in oil,
mud, and rocks falling on their property, were entitled to
"eviction" damages on a trespass theory even though the oil
company was not negligent in conducting the drilling
operation. 7 Similarly, residents who were evacuated as a
result of a release of sulfuric acid that vaporized into the
atmosphere were allowed to claim damages for inconvenience,
as well as personal injuries.378 The creation of smells and
noxious odors that are a source of discomfort or that diminish
the value of neighboring property constitutes a nuisance.7 9
Similarly, the disruption in the life activities of plaintiffs
and the community in which they reside or work caused by the
release is a compensable personal discomfort. In Potter, the
plaintiffs, whose water supply had been contaminated, were
awarded damages by the trial court for the general disruption
of their lives and invasion of their privacy. The plaintiffs had to
shower elsewhere, use bottled water, and submit to intrusions
by numerous agencies involved in testing water and soil.380
Where a city constructed a sewage treatment plant near
the plaintiffs home, causing discomfort to the plaintiff and his
family because they had to move from the house to avoid the
unbearable, noxious odors, plaintiff recovered damages for the
diminished value of the property, damages for personal
discomfort, and damages for the additional costs of obtaining
financing for their home.381
376. See Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328 (1960).
377. See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328 (1928).
378. See Mcgee v. Shell Oil Co., 659 So. 2d 812, 813 (La. App. 5th. Cir. 1995).
379. See Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal. 3d 285, 293-94 (1977)
(concerning a sewage treatment plant); see also Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 370
(1933) (concerning an asphalt mixing plant); Wade v. Campbell, 19 Cal. Rptr. 173
(Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (concerning a dairy farm). But see Rynsburger v. Dairymen's
Fertilizer Coop. Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 102 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
380. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993). The
award was not challenged on review. See id. at 980.
381. See Varjabedian, 20 Cal. 3d 285. The court also held that the city's plant
operation creating the nuisance may also be a ground for an action for inverse
condemnation, where plaintiffs property was rendered "untenantable for
residential purposes" entitling plaintiff to just compensation for the resulting
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A dangerous condition created by others, which causes an
emergency and renders the continued occupation of citizens in
their homes unsafe, is a "partial eviction" of citizens from their
property.38 2

A partial eviction can also occur when the

dangerous condition destroys the citizens' use and enjoyment of
their property. In any hazmat incident, citizens in fear for their
own and their family's safety typically would seek the safety of
their homes, offices, or schoolrooms. They typically would also
attempt to depart and evacuate from the scene of a hazmat
release, as a reasonable precautionary measure, even without a
governmental shelter in place or evacuation order. This
resulting disruption in the citizens' lives is a detriment that is
reasonably foreseeable by hazmat handlers.
Similarly, the regularity of hazmat incidents and releases
of toxic chemicals from facilities which travel offsite and impact
communities by way of repeated exposures and injuries
unnecessarily inflict extreme pressure and fear in the lives of
Such insult should be
the people in the community.
compensated.
3. Mental and Emotional Suffering
A plaintiff may only recover for serious emotional
distress.83 However, fear and anxiety may arise during the
toxic episode, as well as after.384 Indeed, in some communities
that exist in the shadow of frequent hazmat episodes, such as
Richmond, California, fear and anxiety may exist even before a
toxic episode. As addressed by the House of Representatives
Investigative Report of the General Chemical Release:
Contra Costa County in Northern California is one
example of a densely populated community coexisting with
heavy industry. Accidents are commonplace; since 1980
the County's Hazardous Materials Unit has responded to
35 accidents, and there have been several more less
serious incidents. One of the most dangerous accidents
occurred on July 26, 1993 when oleum leaked from a tank
car during unloading at General Chemical's Richmond
facility. A toxic sulfuric acid cloud measuring several
"taking" of his property. See id. at 296-99.
382. See McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 253 (1946).
383. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 989 n.12; see also 2 COMM. ON STANDARD JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 163, §§ 12.72-12.73, 12.80.
384. See, eg., Miller, supra note 312, at 688-90 (distinguishing the emotional
consequences of toxic torts from those of traditional torts).
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miles in size passed over the area, causing alarm, panic
and fear....

Contra Costa County has the highest concentration of
hazardous materials per square mile of any county in
California. The region's residentslive daily with the threat
posed by these materials. Although the risk of accidents
can never be eliminated, all possible steps must be taken
to reduce this risk. Steps must also be taken to improve
current emergency notification and response procedures.
The recommendations outlined in this report should be
followed to help achieve these goals. 8 '

Moreover, there are many species of emotional distress. In
Pintor v. Ong,386 the court stated that "the injury must be
severe, i.e., substantial or enduring as distinguished from

trivial or transitory," and further stated that, "[t]he range of

injury broadly encompasses ... all highly unpleasant mental
reactions . . ." and "includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety,
worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well
as physical pain." 87
a. PsychologicalDisorders
Claims have been brought for post-traumatic stress
disorder ("PTSD") based upon exposure to environmental
contaminants."' PTSD claims involve allegations of distinct
and specific mental injury. Essentially, such a claim requires
proof that a particular traumatic event, a recognized stressor,
would produce significant symptoms of distress in almost
everyone experiencing such an event. 89 Before recovering for
385. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM.

ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 103D CONG., REPORT ON LIVING WITH RISK:
COMMUNITIES AND THE HAZARD OF INDUSTRIAL CONTAMINATION (Comm. Print
1994) (emphases added).
386. 259 Cal. Rptr. 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).

387. Id. (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 648-49 (1980); cf Tuohey,

supra note 321
388. See generally National Institute of Mental Health, Facts About Anxiety

Disorders <http'//www.nimh.nih.gov/anidety/idxfax.htm>

(identifying

and

defining "post-traumatic stress disorder" as being: "Persistent symptoms that occur

after experiencing a traumatic event such as rape or other criminal assault, war,
child abuse, natural disasters, or crashes. Nightmares, flashbacks, numbing of
emotions, depression, and feeling angry, irritable or distracted and being easily
startled are common."). See also Bowler & Schwarzer, supra note 65, at 167-80; M.
DORE, LAW OF Toxic TORTS § 7.02A (1998) (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD)).
389. PTSD patients are described as being "stuck in time and are continually re-
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PTSD, a claimant may be obliged to establish the requisite
symptoms for PTSD set out in the American Psychiatric
Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders."'
Hazmat releases, which a community is repeatedly
subjected to, or ones that are of sufficient magnitude as to
require preventative and other precautionary measures,
arguably constitute psychologically traumatic events because
they produce significant symptoms of distress in anyone
experiencing such events."' A person suffering PTSD need not
experience a traumatic event but may have witnessed or been
confronted with an event that involved actual or threatened
death, serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of
himself or of others, and suffered intense fear, helplessness or
horror as a result."' PTSD can affect young children."'
b. Fearof Future Cancer,Serious Illness, or Injury
The unique nature of toxic torts, particularly the long
latency periods associated with cancer (and perhaps other
serious diseases) 94 has produced claims, not only for actual
injuries from exposure, but also for the increased risk of
developing cancer. Toxic torts also present claims for emotional
distress arising from the fear of contracting cancer, and for
exposed to the traumatic event through daytime recollections that persistently
interrupt ongoing thoughts, actions or feelings. . . . They cannot tolerate any
reminders of the trauma since these often trigger intense fear, anxiety, guilt, rage
or disgust." Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD Diagnosis and Treatment for Mental
Health Clinicians, 32(2) COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 173-89 (1996) (Dr.
Friedman is the Executive Director of the National Center for PTSD). See, e.g.,
Potter v. Forestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 978 (1993) (individuals who
unknowingly drank water from contaminated well awarded damages for
"psychiatric illness"); see also, Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d
889 (W. Va. 1991) (PTSD suffered by person bit by patient with AIDS).
390. See National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 388; see also
AMERICAN PsYCHIATRIC ASSN, DIAGNOsTIC AND STATIsTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994 ); Friedman, supra note 389.
391. See, e., Bowler et al., supra note 65, at 455-71; Bowler et al, supra note
35, at 470-97. See also Bowler & Schwarzer, supra note 65; Report on Hazardous
Materials, supra note 28.
392. See Friedman, supra note 389.
393. See id.
394. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 980 n.5 (1993)
("[Wihile plaintiffs identified fear of cancer as the principal basis for the emotional
distress claim at issue, our discussion is equally relevant to emotional distress
engendered by fear that other types of serious physical illness or injury may result
from toxic exposure.").
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medical monitoring to detect the onset of such diseases." 5
As a result of the latency period within which some
symptoms manifest, victims may wait months, years, or even
decades while tests and examinations are conducted to
determine whether they have life threatening diseases
resulting from hazmat exposure.89 Another difficult question
in the toxic tort context is whether the passage of time can
serve to make causation too remote to permit imposition of
liability.397 Some authorities comment that the lapse of
considerable time during which a negligently created condition
remains static will not negate liability.898
Claims for fear of cancer seek damages for the emotional
distress suffered. Damages for emotional distress for fear of
cancer in the absence of a present physical injury or illness may
be recovered only if a plaintiff proves that (1) as a result of
defendant's conduct, plaintiff is exposed to a toxic substance
that threatens cancer, and (2) plaintiffs fear stems from a
knowledge, corroborated by reliable scientific and medical
opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will
develop cancer in the future due to the exposure.399 Toxic
exposure is required, but the exposure itself is not enough to
establish the reasonableness of fear of cancer."' The standard
of proof is lower; a claim for fear of cancer or other serious
395. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION, supra note 178, at 130-31.
396. A dilemma confronting every potential hazmat plaintiff is whether to sue
immediately by virtue of suffering "appreciable harm" either by way of economic
loss or physical injury. Under present interpretations of statutes of limitation and
the common law policy against splitting causes of action, plaintiffs must sue
immediately or be forever barred. See Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 883
n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting). But see Angeles Chem. Co. v.
Spencer & Jones, 51 Cal. Rptr. 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (liberal construction of
statute of limitations under CERCLA). See also Miller, supra note 312, at 694-95.
397. See, e., Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741 (1968) (stating that a cause of
action for emotional trauma should be sustained whenever the injury was
reasonably foreseeable, "excluding the remote and unexpected").
398. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 233, at 277-78; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 433(c) (1984); see also Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 37 Cal. Rptr.
2d 902, 906-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating several considerations in establishing
causation) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(c)).

In the asbestos

exposure context, the plaintiff must show that exposure was a substantialfactor in
contributing to his injury, and plaintiff who, inter alia, worked with or near
asbestos product over 30 years showed sufficient evidence from which inference of
causation could be made.
399. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 997.
400. See id. at 989.
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injury may be made without demonstrating that cancer is more
likely than not to occur where it is pleaded and shown that the
defendant's conduct in causing the exposure amounts to
oppression, fraud, malice, or "despicable conduct which is
carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others." '°
More is required, however, than mere proof that the
defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. The plaintiff
must demonstrate that his fear of cancer is "reasonable,
genuine and serious," and the fear must stem from knowledge,
corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that the
toxic exposure has "significantly increased the plaintiffs risk of
cancer and has resulted in an actual risk of cancer that is
significant.""°2 The standard of proof is the same in the event
defendant is liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a result of defendant's "extreme and outrageous
conduct, ' " or when the defendant has acted oppressively,
fraudulently, or maliciously, and even when there is technical
battery.4 "4
If a person intends to injure or to inflict emotional distress
upon another by poisoning, and there is no scientific proof that
the victim was injured, then the victim, following the rule of
Potter, would have no cause of action for negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Such a result is
hard to comprehend.
The real question in toxic tort cases is whether it is
advisable to claim the "fear of developing cancer or other
serious injury" type of emotional distress damages and
accordingly be saddled with the stringent burden of producing
reliable scientific proof of injury.4 6 If that specie of emotional
401. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West 1999).
402. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th 999-1000.
403. Id. at 1003-04.
404. See Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal Rptr. 2d 172, 181 (1994) (patient operated on
by physician who later learns that the physician was infected at the time with HiIV
has no claim for emotional distress damages). Compare Kerins with Johnson v.
West Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va 1991) (security guard bitten by
patient with AIDS entitled to emotional distress damages against hospital). See
generally Sarno, supra note 322.
405. The main issue on review in Potter was "whether emotional distress
engendered by fear of cancer or other serious physical illness or injury" may be
recovered in a negligence action. Potter 6 Cal. 4th at 973. The trial court in Potter
had awarded "psychiatric illness" damages ($269,500) to the plaintiffs separate and
distinct from the fear of cancer damages awarded ($800,000). Id. at 980. Firestone
did not offer any argument other than its "perfunctory claim that the psychiatric
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distress is neither claimed nor pleaded as a matter of tactical
choice, the question is whether a claim for other serious
emotional distress suffered as a result of the toxic exposure
remains viable." 6 Conversely, in the absence of present injury
the question would be whether fear of future consequences
remains the only detriment in every toxic exposure case in
which the Potter standard would apply. An affirmative answer
would consequently leave plaintiff without recourse.
For example, compare Potter with Wooden, which involved
a plaintiffs contemporaneous fear for her safety from a
threatened impact by an automobile negligently driven by
defendant. In that case, there was no discussion as to the
nature or seriousness of the injury from the threatened
automobile impact, but the court nevertheless permitted
emotional distress damages for plaintiffs fear for her own
safety. Thus, in a negligence case, a plaintiff has a right to
recover damages for fright, shock, and nervous distress when
the negligent conduct of a defendant places the plaintiff
personally at risk and causes the plaintiff to reasonably fear for
his own safety. This is true even in the absence of any
injurious impact.4 7
Just as the plaintiff in Wooden was entitled to recover
emotional distress damages, so must a person who is in danger
of hazmat exposure or who is actually poisoned by hazmat as a
result of a defendant's negligent conduct. These plaintiffs
should be able to recover emotional distress damages, even
though the conduct did not result in actual physical injury. In
such a hazmat incident, the plaintiff is a direct victim who has
been exposed to toxins and who personally will suffer the risk of
physical injury as a result of defendant's conduct. The result in
Potter is to give the individual victim of a toxic tort less
protection than would be accorded the victim of a traditional
course of negligent conduct. °8
illness component of the award is erroneous," and the California Supreme Court
did not consider the matter. Id.
406. The California Supreme Court in Pottertreated "fear of cancer" damages as
a distinct form of distress, emphasizing that "the only damages at issue here are
the fear of cancer component of the emotional distress award . . . ." Id. at 980
(emphasis added). See also Miller, supra note 312, at 684 (a particular type of
emotional distress common to toxic exposure cases is the anxiety or worry over
contracting a disease in the future, or fear of future harm, a "subset" of emotional
distress).
407. See Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
408. See Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 1020.
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A direct victim who suffers physical injury is entitled to
409
including
recover all reasonably foreseeable damages,
damages for emotional distress resulting from witnessing
injuries to a third person, related or not.41° The category of tort
would not be based upon the bystander theory, but on a direct
"'
In such a case, a relationship between the
victim case.41
plaintiff and the third party injured is "relevant only in
determining the validity or severity of the claimed emotional
12
distress.""
Extending this analysis, inasmuch as the plaintiff in
Wooden was a direct victim entitled to recover emotional
distress damages for fear of the danger to her safety from the
defendant's negligent conduct, the above principle can be
applied to her so as to allow her an additional recovery for
emotional distress claims for her fear in seeing others suffer. In
other words, emotional distress from seeing others injured is
available as a consequential injury to all direct victims,
whether or not they are physically injured. No published case
has dealt directly with this issue in a negligent toxic tort
context.
However, in a nuisance case, it is well settled that where
tortious conduct causes mental suffering and emotional
distress, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the mental
suffering.413 In Acadia, the defendant tortiously breached an
agreement by shutting off plaintiffs' water supply. The
disruption of the water supply was a nuisance, and it interfered
with the use and enjoyment of the land by the plaintiff and his
wife, who consequently suffered a relapse of her mental illness.
The husband was awarded emotional distress damages for his
observation of his wife's mental suffering.4

4

409. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333 (West 1997).
410. See Longv. PKS, Inc., 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 104-08 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

411. As observed by the court, "once a plaintiff has been negligently placed
within the area of physical risk and has actually sustained a physical impact,
his cause of action for emotional distress is not limited to the psychological
sequelae which as a matter of reasonable foreseeability result from the episode
as a whole." Id. at 107-08 (citing Eyrich v. Dam, 473 A.2d 539, 564 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984)).
412. Id. at 107.
413. See Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 337-38 (1960).
414. See id. The California Supreme Court recognized that the discomfort and
annoyance to a plaintiff as a result of a nuisance is separate and distinct from the
mental suffering of fearing for the safety of others (plaintiffs wife):
It is settled that, regardless of whether the occupant of land has
sustained physical injury, he may recover damages for the discomfort
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Severe emotional distress damages for fear of one's safety
and for the safety of one's family (as in Acadia) are thus
recoverable even in the absence of physical injury. Severe
emotional distress experienced upon discovery that one or one's
family had historically consumed toxic and carcinogenic
substances in a contaminated water supply (as in Potter)
presents a worse scenario than that in Acadia. Yet, the Potter
court, because it involved a negligence claim only, restricted
recovery of emotional distress damages (for fear of cancer)
because there was no physical injury.
A family that consumes contaminated water for twenty
years and later discovers this fact is most certain to suffer
severe emotional distress. The family then has to undergo tests
and examinations to determine whether they have been injured
or not.415 A lay person's perceptions of the consequences of his
toxic exposure lack medical or scientific input. Such a family
will languish, not knowing whether they will suffer any lifethreatening or debilitating injury in the future. 16 Following
disclosure of the hazmat exposure, the family predictably will
experience a traumatic episode, and until any present and
future injury is ruled out, the family will have to further endure
the uncertainty of their lives. Emotional distress damages have
been awarded in circumstances involving less toxic or non-life-

and annoyance of himself and the members of his family and for
mental suffering occasioned by fear for the safety of himself and his
family when such discomfort or suffering has been proximately caused
by a trespass or nuisance.
Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
415. See Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
Anyone exposed to toxins and hazmat and who suffers no observable physical
injury but must undergo medically necessary tests to determine whether injuries
exist, may recover any costs incurred as damages. Therefore, although no physical
injury is present, substantial compensable damages accompany the emotional
distress suffered as a consequence of the toxic exposure. See id. at 672-73.
416. It is in the context of this hazmat poisoning that aggressive management
and scrutiny is important to identify early the onset of symptoms or changes, be
they physiological or psychological, attributable to the exposure, particularly in
young children. Medical monitoring as a consequence of the exposure may be
required for years. See, eg., J. Routt Reigart & James R. Roberts, Recognition and
Management of Pesticide Poisonings (5th ed. 1999) (in collaboration with the
Certification and Worker Branch, Field and External Affairs Division, Office of
Pesticide Programs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency). Both authors are
pediatricians specifically focusing on the impact of pesticidal exposure on children
and their implications. Needless to say, many such neurological, psychological,
physiological, and other developmental implications, per se, may well trigger
parental emotional distress.
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threatening ingestion or exposure. For instance, judicial notice
has been accorded by the courts to the fact that a normal
person will suffer emotional disturbance by seeing a repulsive
looking object in a bottle which she had just drunk which may
and often will result in nausea or produce other discomfort or
more serious results.41 7 It is significant that judicial notice of
the resultant emotional disturbance was accorded by the court
in response to the argument that there was no evidence that
the contents of the bottle were deleterious or harmful, or that
no damages could be recovered unless a party was actually
poisoned or was injuriously affected by the drink. 418 A fortiori,
the shock and horror experienced in learning of one's exposure
to carcinogens or harmful substances by drinking contaminated
water or by inhaling polluted air or through other media are a
proximate result of the exposure and a detriment to the wellbeing of an individual that just cannot be ignored. Toxic
hazmat is insidious and life threatening and not merely
offensive to sensitivities.419 Individuals and families caught in
an isolated hazmat release, such as a toxic cloud, will no doubt
experience the same anguish as those whose sensitivities are
offended.
Even if the threat of cancer or other serious injury were
eventually dispelled, the family already would have suffered
emotionally and mentally. 4 ° During this interlude, the victims
suffer the same emotional distress as a person who is later
determined to have a "more likely than not" chance of
developing cancer in the future. Furthermore, there is no relief
to the victim who learns that he has only a forty-nine or thirty
percent chance of developing cancer. The Potter court did not
417. See, e.g., Moss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 380 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1951) (bottle contained dead mouse); Medeiros v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Turlock, 57 Cal. App. 2d 707 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (bottle contained cleaning
brush).
418. See Moss, 103 Cal. App. 2d at 383 (citing Medeiros, 57 Cal. App. 2d at
714).
419. See Tuohey, supra note 202, at 34; see also Walter M. Rogers, It's All
Right to Kill People, but Not Trees, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893 (1991).
420. In Lexton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982),
plaintiffs who unknowingly ingested water contaminated with chlordane, a
highly toxic substance, were allowed to recover damages for mental suffering as
a result of their natural concern and anxiety over the harmful effects of the
substance to their own health and the health of their children. Damages for
mental anguish were limited to the time between the discovery of the ingestion
of the toxic substance and the time of the negative medical diagnosis or other
information that put to rest the fear of injury.
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erect the unrealistically high standard on the basis that
emotional harm could not have resulted from defendant's
conduct. The Potter majority acknowledged that it would be
reasonable for a person who ingested toxic substances to harbor
a genuine and serious fear of cancer, stating that "we would be
very hard pressed to find that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff
faced with a 20 percent or 30 percent chance of developing
cancer cannot genuinely, seriously and reasonably fear the
prospect of cancer.4 21 It concluded that the standard it was
establishing would "foreclose compensation to many persons
with genuine and objectively reasonable fear." 22
California recognizes a cause of action for a parent or other
close family member who witnesses tortious physical injury to
her family member. By the same token, if a close family
member witnesses the tortious envelopment of her relative in a
cloud of poisonous gas, or learns that she unwittingly witnessed
her child drink poisonous water or play in contaminated soil for
years, an action for emotional distress is warranted.
In the final analysis, is there a distinction between the
emotional distress resulting from the threat posed by a hazmat
release for which an action would lie, as compared with that
which results from a long term, insidious hazmat exposure, and
its sequelae? In either case, the victim and the victim's family
should be entitled to their damages for their respective
emotional distress just as in any other tort.
The only
distinction may be a visual one in that the victim in a hazmat
exposure may not necessarily manifest an immediate physical
injury, whereby both he and his family thereafter are reduced
to waiting for the symptoms.
Some authors have commented that the "more likely than
not" threshold is an arbitrary barrier set up by the Potter court
to establish a "bright-line" rule which takes away the issue of
the reasonableness of the fear from the jury and whose purpose
is "to avoid the difficulties of adjudicating claims on their
merits.' 23 It is clear that the unsympathetic analysis given by
the Potter court was meant to categorically restrict emotional
distress claims in negligence cases, using policy arguments that
an unrestricted class of plaintiffs would overburden the judicial
process.
421. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 990 (1993).
422. Id. at 993.
423. Miller, supra note 179, at 705; see also Donovan, supra note 179, at 1391.
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Potter, unlike Acadia, did not deal with a nuisance or
trespass cause of action and its ramifications. Expressly citing
Acadia, the majority in Potter acknowledged that emotional
distress damages would be recoverable without physical injury
when caused by a nuisance condition or trespass. 424 Had Potter
involved a nuisance or trespass cause of action, the result could
have been different. 4" The Potter majority took great measures
to limit its holding allowing the recovery of emotional distress
damages to an action based solely upon negligence. The court
meticulously avoided addressing the issue of whether such
damages could be recovered based upon intentional
misconduct.4 6 For instance, in attempting to carve out an
exception to the "more likely than not" threshold, the court
suggested looking at the "totality of circumstances" in
"evaluating a defendant's conduct." 7 The plaintiffs in Potter
contended that the "more likely than not" threshold should not
apply where a defendant violates a statute or regulation
prohibiting the disposal of toxins. Ignoring its own guidance to
consider the "totality of circumstances," the California Supreme
Court stated that any exception to the rule should not focus on
"intentional violators of the law." 42 8 Surprisingly, the court
downgraded the significance of the defendant's intentional
conduct by offering this rationale as to why it should not be an
exception: "For one thing, while a defendant may be aware that
its conduct is wrong and potentially dangerous, it may not have
424. See Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 986 n.10.
425. The dissent stated:
The existing tort of nuisance is also available for cases, like this one, in
which the improper handling of toxic wastes has contaminated a
property owner's source of drinking water. This court has previously
remarked, in the context of a nuisance action, that emotional distress
occasioned by fear of disease resulting from drinking contaminated
water is compensable "atleast where ... the tortious acts are willful."
Id. at 1016 n.1 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Acadia, Cal.,
Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 338 (1960) (citations omitted).
426. See id. at 1013. "[Crleating an anomalous new cause of action in
negligence requiring proof of malicious conduct. When a defendant acts with
conscious disregard of the plaintiffs health and safety and exposes the plaintiff to
toxins, the plaintiff may state a claim for intentional tort." Id. (Mosk, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 'The majority properly recognizes and
applies the principle that greater moral fault justifies increased liability for
resulting harm, but it unaccountably fails to recognize that liability premised on
proof of malice is not liability for negligence." Id. at 1019 (Kennard, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
427. Id. at 998.
428. Id.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

knowledge of a particularstatute or regulation proscribingit."
Alternatively, the California Supreme Court further

speculated, "There may be times where a defendant does not
specifically intend to violate the law, yet the defendant proceeds
to act egregiously in conscious disregard of others." 29
For anyone to speculate about defendant's conduct and
knowledge is, under the facts of Potter, tenuous at best. First,
the Potter court already found that Firestone engaged in
intentional misconduct in that it "actively discouraged
compliance with its internal policies and California law"
prohibiting the disposal of Firestone's hazardous wastes at a
Class II landfill.43
It also found Firestone's conduct was
perpetrated "solely for the sake of reducing corporate costs. '31
The facts were enough to bring Firestone's conduct under the
"oppression, fraud or malice" rule.432
Second, the Potter
majority expressly found that Firestone was aware of the
proscriptions on waste disposal, and found that its
management was specifically informed by a plant engineer
responsible for environmental matters that Firestone's waste
disposal policy "was required by California law." 3 Third,
ignorance of the law is no excuse.434
Section 668 of the
429. Id.
430. See Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 976. The California Supreme Court found the
salient facts regarding Firestone's misconduct to include that the landfill at which
Firestone disposed its wastes is a Class II landfill. Unlike sites classified as Class
I, a Class II landfill is prohibited from taking toxic substances and liquids because
of the danger that they will leach into and contaminate groundwater. Firestone
was informed of the prohibitions at the outset. Firestone's internal policy was to
take its waste to a Class I dump site. This policy was required by California law.
Ignoring its policy and the law, Firestone dumped its liquid and toxic wastes at the
Class II landfill to reduce its costs. See id.
431. Id. at 977. Such a finding of illegal cost reduction efforts might justify a
cause of action for unfair business practices and false advertising as well. See CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (1997).
432. See Potter,6 Cal. 4th at 1000.
433. Id. at 976. See also id. at 1018 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (describing Firestone's conduct as a "flagrant and willful
violation of environmental laws and regulations designed to protect public health").
434. See People v. Snyder, 32 Cal. 3d 590, 592-93 (1982) ("It is an emphatic
postulate of both civil and penal law that ignorance of a law is no excuse for a
violation thereof."); see also Pintor v. Ong, 259 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (arguing the duty of care arising from a statute is absolute; the violation of a
statute is a tort and a defendant who violates a statutory duty is liable for all
consequences of his conduct whether anticipated or not; in this case, defendant was
liable for plaintiffs emotional distress even in the absence of physical injury). In a
nuisance context, at common law, conduct resulting in a public nuisance is an
interference with the public right and constitutes a criminal offense. Moreover, it
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California Evidence Code unequivocally provides: "An unlawful
intent is presumed from the doing of an unlawful act." As
discussed, evidence in Potter pointed to Firestone's willful
misconduct and violation of the law. No evidence showed that
it was otherwise sufficient to overcome the presumption of law.
Despite finding that Firestone acted reprehensibly and in
conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others, the
California Supreme Court again underscored the fact that it
was dealing with a negligence case. It stated, inter alia, that,
"punitive damages may be assessed in cases on unintentional
5
tort actions under Civil Code section 3294.14
The "guarantee of genuineness" requirement to meet the
standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress
Intentionally inflicted
considers a defendant's conduct.436
emotional distress is a traditional guarantee of the genuineness
of a plaintiffs claim for emotional distress, as well as a built in
inhibitor of proliferating lawsuits.437 When the nature of these
toxic torts is considered in combination with the other
circumstances present, a plaintiffs right to recovery simply
Where the toxic tort is a
cannot be seriously questioned.'
result of intentional conduct of the defendant, such conduct by
itself may well be sufficient to establish the genuineness of the
emotional distress claim.
also constitutes a tort. See id.; see also Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575, 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1984)). Where specific conduct is
proscribed by statute, consistent with common law, a defendant may be held in
violation of the statute "even though his interference with the public right was
purely accidental and unintentional." Leslie Salt, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 584. Thus,
whether the context be civil or criminal, in the event of a violation of a statute,
liability is strictly imposed. See id. at 585-86; People v. Chevron Chem. Co., 191
Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (criminal).
435. Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004; see also id. at 1000 n.20 (stating that the burden
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence for a plaintiff to recover compensatory
damages "when a defendant has acted with 'oppression, fraud or malice' to
negligently inflict emotional distress" (emphasis added)).
436. See, e.g., Mercado v. Leong, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 574 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330 (1952); Emden v.
Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313 (1948); see also Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 976; Thing v. La
Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644 (1980).
437. See, eg., Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 648-50.
438. See, e.g., Acadia, Cal., Ltd. v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 337-38 (1960)
(holding that the defendant acted with malice or intent to oppress and was liable
for punitive damages and for the emotional distress suffered by a husband and wife
even in the absence of physical injury; the plaintiffs distress was proximately
caused by the defendant's wrongful acts, and therefore, it was immaterial whether
the defendant knew of the wife's unstable mental condition).
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At common law, in actions for the torts of assault, slander,
or libel per se, recovery was permitted for mental distress
without the need to show physical or financial injury. 9 Where
these torts have been committed, the genuineness of mental
distress is guaranteed by the nature of the tortious conduct
itself because any reasonable person would suffer mental
distress as a result of such acts. Indeed, as the California
Supreme Court explained in Molien, any intentional tort "will
support an award for emotional distress alone, but only in cases
involving 'extreme and outrageous invasions of one's mental
and emotional tranquility.""' ° In such cases, "it is the
outrageous conduct that serves to insure that the plaintiff
experienced serious mental suffering and convinces the courts
of the validity of the claim.""'
In other words, "[tihe
outrageousness is considered a sufficient screening device in
itself so that the other screening mechanisms can be eliminated
without raising fears of frivolous claims and a flood of
litigation.""'
VI. CONCLUSION

Starting with the Industrial Revolution, through the end of
the Twentieth Century and beyond,
American industry
successfully socialized many of its costs, such as hazmat
disposal of solid wastes, emitting air pollution from smokestack
facilities and vehicles, and the diversion of industrial wastes to
(public) municipal waste treatment facilities. At the same time,
it privatized profits, which resulted in part from such cost
cutting and saving."" Toward the end of the Twentieth
Century, it became apparent that many of these socialized,
publicly underwritten or absorbed costs were no longer
tolerable and were to be replaced with industrial user fees,
stronger environmental law enforcement, increased fines, and
civil liability, as matters of public policy.
Governmental institutions, including
courts and
439. See Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 648-50; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 233, §
10, at 43, § 112, at 794-95.
440. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 927 (1980) (quoting Alcorn v.
Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 498 (1970).
441. Id.
442. Terry M. Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries:A

Solution or a Pandora'sBox?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 558 (1984); see also Thing,
48 Cal. 3d 644, 649.
443. For an excellent discussion on these issues, see Melosi, supra note 274.
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legislatures, tolerated toxic abuses. Sometimes this occurred
because of occasional war research and productive imperatives,
and always because of the political rationalization of a full
working economy. Ironically, a portion of the employment
sector now consists, and for the foreseeable future will consist,
of an "aftermarket" directed toward detecting, undoing, and
remedying much of that damage.
Legal precedents such as Venuto, and statutory limitations
such as public nuisance liability (immunity), " are tantamount
to granting immunity from damages. They should now be
revisited and remedied. Public policy, such as that set forth in
Potter, needs to be fully clarified by the courts, if not modified
by the legislature.
An effective, democratic and uniform judicial system with
bright line tests is an alternative to subjective, inconsistent
judicial "gatekeeping" and "public policy" pronouncements, ex
cathedra,in toxic tort litigation. This is particularly true where
the public is unfairly made to bear the economic detriment and
emotional distress of an industry's, and sometimes the
government's, tortious conduct involving releases of hazmat.
Such circumstances are hardly consistent with the social
contract theory and, indeed, are detrimental to a vulnerable
sector of society all too often reduced to living in proximity to
hazmat point sources.
In a hazmat incident, sheltering in place, evacuation,
disruption, and other detriment to the lives of people in the
affected community are the foreseeable consequences of the
conditions created by the hazmat handler or, more accurately,
mishandler. If legal process can effectively address minor
consumer claims by way of class actions and other consumer
legal remedies, wherein class members receive several dollars
each, " 5 then the legal system can and should deal equally well
with mass toxic tort claims, however minor such claims
ultimately may prove to be.
In California, such a judicial pursuit in hazmat litigation is
consistent with express constitutional guarantees possessed by

444. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3493 (West 1872); CAL. PENAL CODE § 374.8 (West
1991).
445. See, e.g., State of California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460 (1986)
(concerning a settlement for millions of consumers which yielded an average
individual recovery of $2.60 to $3.00); cf. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750 et seq., 1781
(West 1970).
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the People as their "inalienable rights." "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."" In the final

analysis the question often becomes: to what extent should the
court's "gatekeeper" function impede a victim with modest

economic detriment or emotional distress from proceeding to
trial and obtaining a jury determination of the full measure of
that victim's damages?
In instances of scaled-down damages in some hazmat
exposures, which often evolve out of dramatic, and sometimes
horrific, episodes, there nevertheless are certain mechanisms
available with which to measure such damages, however
modest they may be. Judicial approaches constantly are being
fashioned and modified so that such damages can be
adjudicated
effectively,
the
number
of
plaintiffs
notwithstanding.
Some of these approaches include the
utilization of aggregation447 or mass toxic tort congregationr44 8 of
multiple plaintiff claims by direct group actions collectively
designated
as
"complex litigation," 9
class
action, 5 °
45
453
consolidation, ' coordination, concerted action, small claim
actions,4 4 global resolutions providing for fluid recovery
446. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 1 (1974) (emphasis added).
447. See generally Cooper, supra note 338; RHEINGOLD, supra note 327. See
also Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 96-85345 (1996); Boston, supra note 42.
448. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 327; Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 9685345 (1996).
449. See CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.

§

19(h) (West 1994); see also Cottle v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882, 886 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992); Dolan v. Buena Eng'rs, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 903, 904-05 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (consolidating lead case with Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 883 n.1); Asbestos
Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry, 267 Cal. Rptr. 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990);
Vermeulen v. Superior Court (Alameda County), 251 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
450. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1872); FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See
generally Coffee, supra note 337.
451. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1048 (West 1971); see, eg., Rutherford v.
Owens-Coming Ill., Inc., 16 Cal. 4th 953 (1997); Cottle, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883; cf
FED. R. CIv. P. 42(a).

452. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 403 et seq. (West 1996); CAL. R. CT. 1500 et
seq. (2000); see also CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 68070 et seq. (West 2000).
453. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 378-379 (West 1872); cf. Orser v. George, 60
Cal. Rptr. 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
454. See City and County of San Francisco v. Small Claims Court, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (concerning 183 consolidated small claims against
the city, alleging airport noise constituted a nuisance).
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funds,455 and trust funding for subsequent injuries. Certainly,
exemplary or punitive damages456 remain an option where
appropriate because the rights and safety of others manifestly
are involved in many toxic episodes.
While such mechanisms may be available, subject to the
litigants' fundamental constitutional rights and safeguards,
basic procedural and substantive rights remain unclear. This is
a result of confusing decisions, such as the stated public policy
arguments favoring insurers expressed in Potter and the
exercise of the court's "inherent powers" expressed in Cottle, to
create a "quasi-summary judgment" concealed in the form of a
motion in limine. The dissenting opinions in both decisions
eloquently state misplaced priorities and inherent dangers. It
is reasonable to anticipate that, when future courts or
legislatures revisit Potter and Cottle, they will do so with more
circumspection and the benefit of more caselaw.
In analyzing Potter, it is worthwhile to again review what
the Potter court expressly stated it was not reviewing. It was
not reviewing the award for the general disruption to plaintiffs'
lives, the psychiatric illness component of the emotional
47
distress award, nor any legal theories, other than negligence. "
Potter was a negligence case only, and the complaint did
not plead nuisance, assault, or trespass. Even here, however,
the Potter court concluded that plaintiffs foreseeability might
be a factor. Such an approach is tantamount to shooting an
arrow into the air and being exonerated because the stricken
plaintiff was not known or contemplated by the shooter, i.e.,
random victims would be without remedy.
What Potter did address was damages for emotional
distress solely for fear of developing cancer or other serious
illness, which might arise in the future. In this narrow subset,
the Potter court concluded that such a fear must be based upon
a condition established by scientific and medical evidence that
it is "more likely than not" to occur. Therefore, the Potter court
implicitly also was not reviewing emotional distress already
suffered.
Such past and present emotional distress can be predicated
455. See Granberry v. Islay Invs., 9 Cal. 4th 738 (1995); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
384 (West 1993) (prescribing the disposition of residual funding).
456. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1905).
457. See Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 980 (1993);
Aas v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 627, 652 n.16 (2000).
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upon a severe fear or anxiety of one's safety and for the safety
of one's family members contemporaneously experienced in a
single toxic cloud incident or upon belatedly learning that one
or one's family was historically impacted by contaminated soil
or water. A toxic exposure will not always place the victim at
risk for cancer or disease. However, between the time of
exposure and definitively learning from scientific and medical
experts that such a result is not more than likely to occur, a
plaintiff nevertheless would be agonizing over the consequences
of his toxic exposure.
For many victims, this emotional distress may be their
worst injury. Between the two milestones in time, a victim of
toxic exposure should be entitled to compensation for all
emotional distress suffered for his own safety and for that of his
family.
It has been suggested that Potter lets plaintiffs fall back on
the alternative cause of action predicated upon a current
physical injury,4 but the Potter court left unresolved the
definition of a physical injury (as it relates to cellular damage
or injury to the immune system). That issue has now been
decided in Duarte v. Zachariah,5 9 which held that damage to
the immune system is physical harm.46 °
Thus, the narrowly restrictive nature of Potter may be its
saving aspect. Potter appears to be limited to actions based
only upon a negligence theory, and the restrictions to recovery
of emotional distress relate to the "fear of cancer and other
serious illness or injury" component of emotional distress. As
Potter acknowledged, there is sufficient basis in nuisance law
for a victim to recover emotional distress damages, even
including a "fear of cancer or other serious injury" claim,
despite the absence of injury.
These nuisance cases allow recovery for damages for
"discomfort and annoyance" as well as damages for "mental
suffering" occasioned by fear over the safety of others. This is
somewhat of a hybrid "direct victim" and "bystander" claim.
Furthermore, there are non-impact, non-injury cases that
correctly apply negligent tort principles and allow for a victim,
who experiences a "fear for his safety," to recover emotional
distress absent physical injury. In these cases, typified by
458. See Donovan, supra note 179.
459. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
460. See supra Part IV.F.
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Wooden v. Raveling,461 recovery has been allowed without the
burden of proving the nature of the injury that might have
occurred or the medical probabilities of the injury developing.
The tort principle of authorizing recovery for emotional
distress when a plaintiff is personally endangered by a
defendant's negligent conduct and suffers serious emotional
distress out of fear for his own safety should apply to support
a toxic exposure plaintiffs claim for damages for serious
emotional distress as a result of their concern for their own
health.
Even short of toxic exposure, the general disruption of a
community caused by a hazmat incident represents another
detriment that the judicial system should countenance. As
shown, the mere threat of harm is sufficient for liability to
attach. The inconvenience and constraints on movement to
community residents, including making them prisoners in their
own homes, and isolating them from relatives and friends,
should all be compensable detriment. Freedom to leave one's
house or workplace and to move about at will, with a measure
of personal security, is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty'"62 enshrined in our history and in our Constitution.463
In addition to such personal health and safety
considerations, fear of an adverse impact upon one's real
property value because of on- and off-site contamination is a
platform from which severe emotional distress should become
actionable in negligence, nuisance, or trespass. Environmental
constraints on the use of real property, the inability to sell, and
enjoyment of property constitute a private nuisance.
As the cases show, in the event of a nuisance, emotional
distress damages are recoverable, even in the absence of
physical injury. Negligence, assault, trespass, or other tortious
conduct may well serve as a vehicle for nuisance, although
nuisance is a condition and not necessarily an act or omission.
What then are the factors and the reasonable proposals for
promoting a judicial system that fully recognizes the detriment
that results from a hazmat release and affords relief for the
emotional distress suffered by innocent victims?
461. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891 (1998). See also Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal
Co., 214 Cal. 182 (1931).
462. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
463. There is, of course, also a fundamental constitutional right of an individual
to travel. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958).
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First, technological advances dealing with and mitigating
hazmat are now such that society should no longer tolerate
hazmat contamination impacting innocent victims random or
otherwise. More stringent laws and law enforcement, including
full compensation for emotional distress created by such
abuses, will dissuade further abuses.
Second, the overbroad and highly questionable decision of
Venuto must be revisited. The decision addressed whether air
pollution constitutes a public nuisance and precluded a private
citizen from bringing an action for damages because of the
numerosity of potential plaintiffs. The proposition that one
relinquishes one's right to seek damages if everyone is damaged
simply because it is a public nuisance and creates an immunity
from damages, borders on the absurd. The blurred distinction
of where a private nuisance ends and a public nuisance begins
is questionable, at best, and arbitrary and capricious, at worst.
The victim's damage, however, remains constant.
Third, with specific reference to nuisance, hazmat
contamination always should be deemed to be a continuing
nuisance in that contamination, per se, is against public policy
and should be remedied. In Capogeannis, the court stated its
public policy considerations:
Our conclusion is influenced primarily by policy
considerations identified in Spaulding and cognate cases.
First and foremost, today's environmental awareness
establishes beyond argument that there is simply no
legitimate interest to be served by permitting this
contamination to persist.
Conversely, the well
documented tendency of such contamination to migrate,
particularly in groundwater, strongly supports a
conclusion that the contamination should be cleaned up as
promptly and as thoroughly as possible.
Both
considerations support application, in this case, of the
courts' general preference for a finding of continuing
nuisance (or, at least, of a question close enough to
empower the Capogeannises to proceed upon that theory).
Such a finding will tend to encourage private abatement,
and perhaps monetary cooperation in abatement efforts, if
only to limit successive lawsuits.464
Fourth, a broader and provocative alternative is to simply
464. Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804-05 (Cal. Ct. App.

1993) (citations omitted).
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recognize a separate, independent, and free-standing tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 65
Thus, there are clear indications and opportunities for the
Twenty-First Century to be an important and most provocative
time for rectifying damage done to our planet, our health, and
our safety. We wish our heirs, successors, and assigns the best
in such endeavors, for they will succeed only through the legal
process.

465. See Miller, supra note 179, at 704-05.

